Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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0 attack on China could develop into a long-term, large- 1.0. The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to support an attack on South Korea by North Korea. could degrade their European war effort, especially in If the Soviets adopted this strategy, they would have to a prolonged conflict. consider whether it would provoke a US attack on Soviet port facilities and the Pacific Fleet; and 7. A two-front war with China andl NATO would whether a military action against South Korea would represent the worst case situation for the Soviets. It provoke the Japanese into a more active role in the would involve major ground and tactical air units in area. They would also have to consider whether Asia arid, depending on military developments, could supporting a North Korean attack on the South would require the Soviets to draw upon their strategic reserve precipitate Chinese military action along the Sino- force. Soviet reinforcements would be required to Soviet border. At the same time, the Soviets know that defeat a large Chinese conventional attack or to US nuclear weapons are located in South Korea and permit the Soviets any chance of overrunning all of would have to weigh the risk that a North Korean northern China. If the Soviets were able to maintain attack would provoke an escalatory response there their forward or defensive positions against China, the from the United States and perhaps the eventual leadership probably would continue to give priority introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict consideration to t Western theater. Major Chinese worldwide. The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks attending direct military support of a North of a European war, as the Soviets have simulated in Korean attack would far outweigh the possible benefits exercises, would be likely to cause Moscow to send of tying up the US forces committed to defending some reserves to Asia. South Korea. 8. We have little evidence of Soviet strategy in the event of prolonged conflict with either NATO or Operations in the Pacific China. Although the Soviets have sufficient resources to fight major conventional battles in both theaters 11. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is a large force primar- concurrently, they could hardly count on being able to ily made up of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. mount the massive offensive campaigns against the The submarine force consists of 106 submarines, of various NATO theaters which we describe in chapter which 32 are ballistic missile and 78 cruise missile or IV, while at the same time prosecuting a war aimed at torpedo attack units. The surface fleet is made up of the defeat of China. We are unable to predict, how- 35 cruisers, destroyers, and Krivak-class missile frig- ever, the circumstances in which the Soviets would ates in addition to numerous smaller combatants, shift forces from one theater to the other during a Nearly all of the fleet is based either in Vladivostok or prolonged two-front war. Petropavlovsk. Soviet naval airpower in the area in- cludes about 175 strike, reconnaissance, and tanker aircraft, about 65 fixed-wing and about 55 helicopter Operations Against South Korea antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. Most aircraft are based in the vicinity of Vladivostok, some strike 9. The Soviets probably would regard Korea as a aircraft are based farther north, and some reconnais- potential problem during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. sance and ASW aircraft are based in Petropavlovsk. A Although they recognize that the South Koreans pose naval infantry force of about 6,000 men is based near no direct threat to the USSR, they no doubt realize Vladivostok. (See tables B-4, B-5, and B-6 of annex B that the US facilities and some forces in the Republic for a detailed order of battle of the Soviet Pacific of Korea (South Korea) could be used to support a war Fleet.) against them. Whether hostilities are initiated against South Korea would be primarily a North Korean 12. The Pacific Fleet conducts routine operations decision, although the Soviets could encourage the and the great majority of its training in the Sea of North Koreans to attack the South. In any event, Japan, along the Kuril Islands, and off the Kamchatka Moscow would probably provide logistic support to Peninsula. Except for Indian Ocean deployments and North Korea if war broke out on the Korean Peninsula annual ASW exercises in the Philippine Sea, surface in the hope that a major conventional war on the combatants do not normally operate in the open ocean Korean Peninsula would pin down US forces there and areas of the Pacific. Intelligence collection patrols are reduce the US ability to reinforce Europe or strike routinely maintained off some US naval facilities in targets in the Soviet Far East. the Pacific and periodically conducted in the A-2 T~Scet
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.