“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
lop 5et
ANNEX A
SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN
THEATER DURING A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR
1. In this annex we briefly consider some possible influence. In addition, both the European and Far
Soviet military operations in distant areas during the Eastern theaters are contiguous to the Soviet Union
early phase of a conventional European conflict, and and, except for naval units, operations there would not
the factors which would impinge on Soviet decisions. require transfer of combat or support forces overseas
Only major ground, air, or naval operations are consid- or through exposed areas. Soviet ground forces at-
ered. Isolated commando-type raids or small-scale tempting to conduct operations in noncontiguous areas
naval and air actions are beyond the scope of this probably would have to contend with hostile forces in
Estimate. transit. Exterior lines of communication would have to
2. Although Soviet leaders would prefer not to fight be established and maintained by force, and any pre-
a war in Europe and Asia at the same time, they positioned Soviet forces would be exposed to hostile
evidently believe that there is a serious possibility of forces and subject to interdiction. These factors would
simultaneous hositilities in both theaters and are pre- also constram any sigmficant Soviet support for oper-
paring for this contingency. The Soviets maintain large ations by friendly forces.
forces, independently controlled and supported, di-
rectly opposite both NATO and China and could Operations Against China
sustain large-scale combat in both theaters con- 5. The major buildup of Soviet forces in Asia began
currently. However, the great distances from the in the mid-1960s, and currently some 47 divisions
European part of the USSR, the poorly developed composed of almost 500,000 men, one-fourth to one-
transportation -network in the Asiatic part, and the third of the USSR's ground and air forces, are de-
enormous frontages which would have to be defended ployed there (see annex B for order-of-battle informa-
would severely strain Soviet capabilities to support tion). The Soviet ground and supporting tactical air
forces in Asia if a war should be prolonged. forces in Asia are deployed primarily along the Sino-
3. We judge that the Soviets would not initiate Soviet border. Soviet strategic attack, air defense, and
operations which would impair their ability to achieve naval forces in the Far East support the Soviet military
a quick victory in Europe. Undertaking large-scale posture against the United States and its allies and
military operations in distant areas would be circum- against China. Soviet exercises usually portray war
scribed for the Soviet Union by two interrelated against China as the result of a Chinese attack before
factors-geography and logistics-and shaped by its or during a war with NATO. We have no knowledge
leaders' perception of objectives, threats, and timing. of Chinese plans to attack the USSR during a NATO-
Despite increasing Soviet strategic concern with China Pact war, however, and tend to believe that the
and the major military buildup they have conducted Chinese would monitor the early course of such a war
in the Far Eastern USSR, the preponderance of evi- before deciding on any action.
dence indicates that their main concern is still with the 6 The Soviets probably would not see it in their
West. In the main body of this Estimate, we conclude
that the Soviets desire a quick victory in Europe. We interest to initiate offensive military operations against
therefore believe that their objectives in Western China during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war unless the
Chinese had massed forces on the border and the
Europe would take precedence over objectives else Soviets concluded that a Chinese attack was imminent.
Chinese forces normally are well back from the
4. An important factor affecting the development frontier, heavily dug in, and could rely on almost
and capabilities of Soviet ground forces is that they are infinite reinforcement on interior lines of communica-
located within the USSR or its contiguous areas of tion. The Soviets would also have to consider that an
A-1