Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
lop 5et ANNEX A SOVIET MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE EUROPEAN THEATER DURING A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR 1. In this annex we briefly consider some possible influence. In addition, both the European and Far Soviet military operations in distant areas during the Eastern theaters are contiguous to the Soviet Union early phase of a conventional European conflict, and and, except for naval units, operations there would not the factors which would impinge on Soviet decisions. require transfer of combat or support forces overseas Only major ground, air, or naval operations are consid- or through exposed areas. Soviet ground forces at- ered. Isolated commando-type raids or small-scale tempting to conduct operations in noncontiguous areas naval and air actions are beyond the scope of this probably would have to contend with hostile forces in Estimate. transit. Exterior lines of communication would have to 2. Although Soviet leaders would prefer not to fight be established and maintained by force, and any pre- a war in Europe and Asia at the same time, they positioned Soviet forces would be exposed to hostile evidently believe that there is a serious possibility of forces and subject to interdiction. These factors would simultaneous hositilities in both theaters and are pre- also constram any sigmficant Soviet support for oper- paring for this contingency. The Soviets maintain large ations by friendly forces. forces, independently controlled and supported, di- rectly opposite both NATO and China and could Operations Against China sustain large-scale combat in both theaters con- 5. The major buildup of Soviet forces in Asia began currently. However, the great distances from the in the mid-1960s, and currently some 47 divisions European part of the USSR, the poorly developed composed of almost 500,000 men, one-fourth to one- transportation -network in the Asiatic part, and the third of the USSR's ground and air forces, are de- enormous frontages which would have to be defended ployed there (see annex B for order-of-battle informa- would severely strain Soviet capabilities to support tion). The Soviet ground and supporting tactical air forces in Asia if a war should be prolonged. forces in Asia are deployed primarily along the Sino- 3. We judge that the Soviets would not initiate Soviet border. Soviet strategic attack, air defense, and operations which would impair their ability to achieve naval forces in the Far East support the Soviet military a quick victory in Europe. Undertaking large-scale posture against the United States and its allies and military operations in distant areas would be circum- against China. Soviet exercises usually portray war scribed for the Soviet Union by two interrelated against China as the result of a Chinese attack before factors-geography and logistics-and shaped by its or during a war with NATO. We have no knowledge leaders' perception of objectives, threats, and timing. of Chinese plans to attack the USSR during a NATO- Despite increasing Soviet strategic concern with China Pact war, however, and tend to believe that the and the major military buildup they have conducted Chinese would monitor the early course of such a war in the Far Eastern USSR, the preponderance of evi- before deciding on any action. dence indicates that their main concern is still with the 6 The Soviets probably would not see it in their West. In the main body of this Estimate, we conclude that the Soviets desire a quick victory in Europe. We interest to initiate offensive military operations against therefore believe that their objectives in Western China during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war unless the Chinese had massed forces on the border and the Europe would take precedence over objectives else Soviets concluded that a Chinese attack was imminent. Chinese forces normally are well back from the 4. An important factor affecting the development frontier, heavily dug in, and could rely on almost and capabilities of Soviet ground forces is that they are infinite reinforcement on interior lines of communica- located within the USSR or its contiguous areas of tion. The Soviets would also have to consider that an A-1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.