Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
command structure could be complete by the early be set up quicker than the equipment it is replacing. 1980s. The unified communications system could be- These developments are expected to continue and gin to improve the Fact's command capabilities by the spread to the NSWP forces. mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until 106. We expect these developments over the next 1990. decade to improve the Pact's ability to: 102. While the Pact is expected to achieve a more - Alert multinational Pact forces during periods of centralized command system through the creation of international tension. permanent theater commands, the Soviets probably will not control the day-to-day peacetime operations - Transfer forces from national to Pact operational of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. The centralized control. control structure would, however, enable them more - Control mobilization and the deployment for- quickly to assume wartime control of Pact forces, once ward of reinforcements. authorized by NSWP leaders. The theater commands would also plan wartime operations and control forces - Better coordinate Pact forces and allocations of during exercises. Hardened command and communi- resources. cations centers which could be used by theater com- - Simplify planning, reallocation of resources, and mands have already been constructed, and more are logistic support for the command and control planned. system through the standardization of communi- 103. The Pact made the decision in 1974 to create cations equipment, computers, and software. by 1990 an integrated communications system to - Coordinate the mobilization and initial move- provide high-capacity communications for Pact forces, ments of the various national fronts and the to include theater commands. This new system-re- allocation of resources among them. ferred to by the Russian acronym VAKSS-is a civilian network which also will provide the Pact with its first 107. Radioelectronic Combat. Pact electronic integrated communications system with the increased warfare capabilities are also expected to be improved communications capability and connectivity necessary with the deployment of additional existing equipment to support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS program is an ambitious one, how- equipment. Some of this advanced electronic equip- ever, and may meet some resistance from NSWP ment would likely include jammers with a higher countries-particularly Romania-that could delay power output and more capability to respond in a completion, even though most of the developments rapidly changing target environment. Some additional specified for VAKSS probably are within the Soviet capabilities in radiofrequency coverage and target- and NSWP technological capabilities. handling capacity could also be realized, 104. When completed, the VAKSS system-pri- marily using buried cables-will become the Pact's principal communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic support field are also likely, although we have little evidence regarding the extent of Pact plans in this area. There probably will be increased mechanization of material-handling procedures, including the com- puterization of supply and repair parts depots and automated inventory and requisition control systems. 105. Improved mobile communications equipment There may also be improvements in transportation, also has been provided to Soviet signal units supporting including greater containerization of supplies and theater, front, army, and lower echelons of command. equipment, as well as increases in the capacities of This equipment provides increased channel capacity cargo carriers, particularly in the fields of tactical and better communications security devices, and it can motor transport. VI-14 Top Secre
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.