Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

command structure could be complete by the early be set up quicker than the equipment it is replacing.
1980s. The unified communications system could be- These developments are expected to continue and
gin to improve the Fact's command capabilities by the spread to the NSWP forces.
mid-1980s, but it is not scheduled for completion until 106. We expect these developments over the next
1990. decade to improve the Pact's ability to:
102. While the Pact is expected to achieve a more - Alert multinational Pact forces during periods of
centralized command system through the creation of international tension.
permanent theater commands, the Soviets probably
will not control the day-to-day peacetime operations - Transfer forces from national to Pact operational
of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. The centralized control.
control structure would, however, enable them more - Control mobilization and the deployment for-
quickly to assume wartime control of Pact forces, once ward of reinforcements.
authorized by NSWP leaders. The theater commands
would also plan wartime operations and control forces - Better coordinate Pact forces and allocations of
during exercises. Hardened command and communi- resources.
cations centers which could be used by theater com- - Simplify planning, reallocation of resources, and
mands have already been constructed, and more are logistic support for the command and control
planned. system through the standardization of communi-
103. The Pact made the decision in 1974 to create cations equipment, computers, and software.
by 1990 an integrated communications system to - Coordinate the mobilization and initial move-
provide high-capacity communications for Pact forces, ments of the various national fronts and the
to include theater commands. This new system-re- allocation of resources among them.
ferred to by the Russian acronym VAKSS-is a civilian
network which also will provide the Pact with its first 107. Radioelectronic Combat. Pact electronic
integrated communications system with the increased warfare capabilities are also expected to be improved
communications capability and connectivity necessary with the deployment of additional existing equipment
to support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic
ture. The VAKSS program is an ambitious one, how- equipment. Some of this advanced electronic equip-
ever, and may meet some resistance from NSWP ment would likely include jammers with a higher
countries-particularly Romania-that could delay power output and more capability to respond in a
completion, even though most of the developments rapidly changing target environment. Some additional
specified for VAKSS probably are within the Soviet capabilities in radiofrequency coverage and target-
and NSWP technological capabilities. handling capacity could also be realized,
104. When completed, the VAKSS system-pri-
marily using buried cables-will become the Pact's
principal communications system for use between
major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis-
tic support field are also likely, although we have little
evidence regarding the extent of Pact plans in this
area. There probably will be increased mechanization
of material-handling procedures, including the com-
puterization of supply and repair parts depots and
automated inventory and requisition control systems.
105. Improved mobile communications equipment There may also be improvements in transportation,
also has been provided to Soviet signal units supporting including greater containerization of supplies and
theater, front, army, and lower echelons of command. equipment, as well as increases in the capacities of
This equipment provides increased channel capacity cargo carriers, particularly in the fields of tactical
and better communications security devices, and it can motor transport.
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