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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Table VI-1
Projected Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces Opposite NATO a
1979, 1983, and 1988
1979 1983 1988
MRBMs and BIBMs
SS-4 Launchers 384 140 0
Silo ....... . ....... 64 56 0
Aboveground 320 84 0
SS-5 Launchers 61 51 0
Silo ...... ..... 27 27 0
Aboveground 34 24 0
SS-20 ........ .... 45-63 171 27
SS-20 Mod 13 . 0 9 171
Bombers of Long Range Aviation
TU-16 Badgers ..... 325 300 250
TU-22 Blinders 155 140 100
Backfires . ... 45 115 160
Ballistic Missile Submarines/Launchers b
SS-N-4 (G-1) 1.......... 1/3 0 0
SS-N -5 (G-Il) ... ........................ 6/18 3/9 0
SS-N -5 (H -I1) ... .... ................... 4/12 0 0
aFor a more detailed treatment of the peripheral strike forces, the implications and possible constraints
of a SALT agreement, and alternative projections of future peripheral strike forces, see NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack.
b Some of the modern Y-class submarines probably have contingency missions for peripheral strike. As
the number of older ballistic missile submarines with peripheral missions declines, some of their target
coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile submarines.
limitation on the rate of Backfire production. If this target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic.
enters into effect, LRA could have almost 200 Back- missile submarines. The range of the missiles carried
fires in 1988, of which about 160 would be deployed by these modern SSBNs gives them greater targeting
opposite NA'TO. In the near term, we expect Backfires flexibility than the G- or H-classes.
to be deployed primarily with LRA units in the
European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially Support Systems and Forces
those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to- 101. Command, Control, and Communications.
surface missiles, to be transferred to the Soviet Far We estimate that, currently, about one week would be
East. required before the Pact's wartime communications
99. The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters
rincs for peripheral strike probably will decline during and to supporting strategic commands. Communica-
the period of our projections. The Soviets probably tions, between Moscow and the fronts and within the
will continue to convert their G-I submarines to attack fronts, to control combat operations by divisions and
or special-purpose submarines or retire them. We armies could be effectively established within a few
estimate that some of the G-II submarines, which are days. However, the Pact has two programs under
targeted against the peripheral areas, will be in the way-the creation of a centralized command structure
force until the mid-1980s, but the last G-II probably and the establishment of a unified communications
will b~e deactivated before 1988. The future of the system-which, during the period of this Estimate,
H-Il submarine as a ballistic missile system is in doubt could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
because of the limitations of a prospective SALT command and control system prepared for war. The
agreement. two programs are intended to establish in peacetime
the theater-level (High Command) resources needed
100. As the number of older ballistic missile subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some of their national control. We estimate that the centralized
VI-13
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.