“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Table VI-1
Projected Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces Opposite NATO a
1979, 1983, and 1988
1979 1983 1988
MRBMs and BIBMs
SS-4 Launchers 384 140 0
Silo ....... . ....... 64 56 0
Aboveground 320 84 0
SS-5 Launchers 61 51 0
Silo ...... ..... 27 27 0
Aboveground 34 24 0
SS-20 ........ .... 45-63 171 27
SS-20 Mod 13 . 0 9 171
Bombers of Long Range Aviation
TU-16 Badgers ..... 325 300 250
TU-22 Blinders 155 140 100
Backfires . ... 45 115 160
Ballistic Missile Submarines/Launchers b
SS-N-4 (G-1) 1.......... 1/3 0 0
SS-N -5 (G-Il) ... ........................ 6/18 3/9 0
SS-N -5 (H -I1) ... .... ................... 4/12 0 0
aFor a more detailed treatment of the peripheral strike forces, the implications and possible constraints
of a SALT agreement, and alternative projections of future peripheral strike forces, see NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack.
b Some of the modern Y-class submarines probably have contingency missions for peripheral strike. As
the number of older ballistic missile submarines with peripheral missions declines, some of their target
coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile submarines.
limitation on the rate of Backfire production. If this target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic.
enters into effect, LRA could have almost 200 Back- missile submarines. The range of the missiles carried
fires in 1988, of which about 160 would be deployed by these modern SSBNs gives them greater targeting
opposite NA'TO. In the near term, we expect Backfires flexibility than the G- or H-classes.
to be deployed primarily with LRA units in the
European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially Support Systems and Forces
those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to- 101. Command, Control, and Communications.
surface missiles, to be transferred to the Soviet Far We estimate that, currently, about one week would be
East. required before the Pact's wartime communications
99. The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters
rincs for peripheral strike probably will decline during and to supporting strategic commands. Communica-
the period of our projections. The Soviets probably tions, between Moscow and the fronts and within the
will continue to convert their G-I submarines to attack fronts, to control combat operations by divisions and
or special-purpose submarines or retire them. We armies could be effectively established within a few
estimate that some of the G-II submarines, which are days. However, the Pact has two programs under
targeted against the peripheral areas, will be in the way-the creation of a centralized command structure
force until the mid-1980s, but the last G-II probably and the establishment of a unified communications
will b~e deactivated before 1988. The future of the system-which, during the period of this Estimate,
H-Il submarine as a ballistic missile system is in doubt could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its
because of the limitations of a prospective SALT command and control system prepared for war. The
agreement. two programs are intended to establish in peacetime
the theater-level (High Command) resources needed
100. As the number of older ballistic missile subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some of their national control. We estimate that the centralized
VI-13
Top 5uet1