Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Table VI-1 Projected Soviet Peripheral Strike Forces Opposite NATO a 1979, 1983, and 1988 1979 1983 1988 MRBMs and BIBMs SS-4 Launchers 384 140 0 Silo ....... . ....... 64 56 0 Aboveground 320 84 0 SS-5 Launchers 61 51 0 Silo ...... ..... 27 27 0 Aboveground 34 24 0 SS-20 ........ .... 45-63 171 27 SS-20 Mod 13 . 0 9 171 Bombers of Long Range Aviation TU-16 Badgers ..... 325 300 250 TU-22 Blinders 155 140 100 Backfires . ... 45 115 160 Ballistic Missile Submarines/Launchers b SS-N-4 (G-1) 1.......... 1/3 0 0 SS-N -5 (G-Il) ... ........................ 6/18 3/9 0 SS-N -5 (H -I1) ... .... ................... 4/12 0 0 aFor a more detailed treatment of the peripheral strike forces, the implications and possible constraints of a SALT agreement, and alternative projections of future peripheral strike forces, see NIE 11-6-78, Soviet Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack. b Some of the modern Y-class submarines probably have contingency missions for peripheral strike. As the number of older ballistic missile submarines with peripheral missions declines, some of their target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic missile submarines. limitation on the rate of Backfire production. If this target coverage may be assumed by modern ballistic. enters into effect, LRA could have almost 200 Back- missile submarines. The range of the missiles carried fires in 1988, of which about 160 would be deployed by these modern SSBNs gives them greater targeting opposite NA'TO. In the near term, we expect Backfires flexibility than the G- or H-classes. to be deployed primarily with LRA units in the European USSR, enabling some Badgers, especially Support Systems and Forces those capable of delivering both bombs and air-to- 101. Command, Control, and Communications. surface missiles, to be transferred to the Soviet Far We estimate that, currently, about one week would be East. required before the Pact's wartime communications 99. The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs for peripheral strike probably will decline during and to supporting strategic commands. Communica- the period of our projections. The Soviets probably tions, between Moscow and the fronts and within the will continue to convert their G-I submarines to attack fronts, to control combat operations by divisions and or special-purpose submarines or retire them. We armies could be effectively established within a few estimate that some of the G-II submarines, which are days. However, the Pact has two programs under targeted against the peripheral areas, will be in the way-the creation of a centralized command structure force until the mid-1980s, but the last G-II probably and the establishment of a unified communications will b~e deactivated before 1988. The future of the system-which, during the period of this Estimate, H-Il submarine as a ballistic missile system is in doubt could shorten the time required by the Pact to get its because of the limitations of a prospective SALT command and control system prepared for war. The agreement. two programs are intended to establish in peacetime the theater-level (High Command) resources needed 100. As the number of older ballistic missile subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some of their national control. We estimate that the centralized VI-13 Top 5uet1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.