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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Top ______
strategic strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance 95. The number of pilots in Soviet units qualified to
in battlefield nuclear capabilities they perceive in the drop nuclear bombs is also expected to grow, particu-
European theater. Force improvements carried out to larly in the fighter-bomber regiments, as the level of
date and ongoing deployment of new systems are pilot experience and proficiency increases and nuclear
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can delivery training is broadened. We do not expect the
employ their theater nuclear forces. In particular, they number of such pilots in the NSWP units to grow,
are acquiring low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and however, because nuclear delivery training probably
delivery systems with sufficient accuracy to permit will continue to be confined to a few specially desig-
employment in close proximity to Pact forces. nated units.
91. Tactical Nuclear Forces. The Soviets will con- 96. The Soviets are expected to continue reequip-
tinue to improve the quality of their tactical ballistic ping their heavy artillery brigades in the USSR with
missile forces by deploying new missiles, introducing the nuclear-capable 203-mm self-propelled guns and
improved guidance systems, and increasing the num- 240-mm self-propelled mortars. All six such brigades
ber of weapons in tactical units. Deployment of the opposite NATO are expected to complete the reequip-
SS-21, the replacement for the FROG division-level ping process within the next several years. It also
weapon, will continue at least through the mid-1980s; seems likely that the Soviets will deploy some nuclear
its deployment with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe artillery to Eastern Europe during the period of this
could occur at any time. The deployment of the SS-22 Estimate. The Soviets probably have the technological
as a replacement for the SS-12 front-level missile capability to develop a 152-mm nuclear artillery
system also is probably under way and will continue round, but we have no reliable evidence that they
until all 12 SS-12 brigades are reequipped. intend to develop and field such a weapon.
92. Increases in Soviet tactical missile forces oppo- 97. Peripheral Strategic Forces. The Soviets will
site NATO are expected over the next several years. continue to rely heavily on land-based ballistic missiles
Three Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany have to conduct strategic nuclear strikes in the areas sur-
already been increased from 12 to 18 launchers. If all rounding the USSR. Some intercontinental ballistic
Soviet Scud brigades in Eastern Europe are similarly missiles probably will continue to have peripheral
augmented-as probably will be the case-the force missions, but the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
will have an additional 66 launchers, bringing the total missile will be the backbone of the peripheral force.
there to 198 Scud launchers. We are unable to predict There is evidence that in late 1975 the Soviets were
whether Scud brigades in the USSR will also be considering a plan to field a force of up to 28 SS-20
expanded. We have recent evidence that the Soviets regiments. Satellite photography of the support bases
plan to increase the number of tactical missile launch- currently under construction indicates that eventually
ers in their divisions from four to six as the SS-21 there will be at least nine SS-20 launchers per regi-
replaces the FROG system. The increases in both Scud ment. We project a total force of 250 to 300 launchers,
and SS-21 launchers would provide the Soviets with and we estimate that such a force could be fully
greater firepower and flexibility during conventional deployed by the early 1980s. We also project that the
and nuclear operations. Soviets will begin fielding a modified version with a
93. A probable replacement for the Scud, the SS-X- more flexible payload and improved accuracy shortly
23, is in an early stage of development. The first flight thereafter. As a result, we project a total force of about
test of this missile was observed in October 1977. This 300 mobile IRBM launchers from 1984 onward. About
system, which is expected to have improved accuracy 200 of these will be deployed in areas opposite NATO.
and reduced reaction time over the current Scud (See table VI-1.)
systems, could reach operational status by 1982. 98. Our force projections assume that the size of the
94. In the Pact tactical air forces, the potential for Long Range Aviation bomber force with a peripheral
nuclear delivery is expected to grow as the aircraft attack mission will remain about the same as at
modernization programs progress over the next dec- present. Some aging Badgers and Blinders probably
ade. In addition, the availability of low-yield warheads will be retired as Backfires are assigned to LRA in
and improved air-to-surface missile guidance systems increasing numbers. By the late 1980s about 270
could induce the Soviets to field an air-delivered Backfires could be in service with LRA if the rate of
tactical missile with a nuclear capability during the production increases as projected. One constraint be-
next few years. ing considered at the strategic arms limitation talks is a
VI--12

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.