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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top ______
strategic strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance 95. The number of pilots in Soviet units qualified to
in battlefield nuclear capabilities they perceive in the drop nuclear bombs is also expected to grow, particu-
European theater. Force improvements carried out to larly in the fighter-bomber regiments, as the level of
date and ongoing deployment of new systems are pilot experience and proficiency increases and nuclear
increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can delivery training is broadened. We do not expect the
employ their theater nuclear forces. In particular, they number of such pilots in the NSWP units to grow,
are acquiring low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and however, because nuclear delivery training probably
delivery systems with sufficient accuracy to permit will continue to be confined to a few specially desig-
employment in close proximity to Pact forces. nated units.
91. Tactical Nuclear Forces. The Soviets will con- 96. The Soviets are expected to continue reequip-
tinue to improve the quality of their tactical ballistic ping their heavy artillery brigades in the USSR with
missile forces by deploying new missiles, introducing the nuclear-capable 203-mm self-propelled guns and
improved guidance systems, and increasing the num- 240-mm self-propelled mortars. All six such brigades
ber of weapons in tactical units. Deployment of the opposite NATO are expected to complete the reequip-
SS-21, the replacement for the FROG division-level ping process within the next several years. It also
weapon, will continue at least through the mid-1980s; seems likely that the Soviets will deploy some nuclear
its deployment with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe artillery to Eastern Europe during the period of this
could occur at any time. The deployment of the SS-22 Estimate. The Soviets probably have the technological
as a replacement for the SS-12 front-level missile capability to develop a 152-mm nuclear artillery
system also is probably under way and will continue round, but we have no reliable evidence that they
until all 12 SS-12 brigades are reequipped. intend to develop and field such a weapon.
92. Increases in Soviet tactical missile forces oppo- 97. Peripheral Strategic Forces. The Soviets will
site NATO are expected over the next several years. continue to rely heavily on land-based ballistic missiles
Three Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany have to conduct strategic nuclear strikes in the areas sur-
already been increased from 12 to 18 launchers. If all rounding the USSR. Some intercontinental ballistic
Soviet Scud brigades in Eastern Europe are similarly missiles probably will continue to have peripheral
augmented-as probably will be the case-the force missions, but the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic
will have an additional 66 launchers, bringing the total missile will be the backbone of the peripheral force.
there to 198 Scud launchers. We are unable to predict There is evidence that in late 1975 the Soviets were
whether Scud brigades in the USSR will also be considering a plan to field a force of up to 28 SS-20
expanded. We have recent evidence that the Soviets regiments. Satellite photography of the support bases
plan to increase the number of tactical missile launch- currently under construction indicates that eventually
ers in their divisions from four to six as the SS-21 there will be at least nine SS-20 launchers per regi-
replaces the FROG system. The increases in both Scud ment. We project a total force of 250 to 300 launchers,
and SS-21 launchers would provide the Soviets with and we estimate that such a force could be fully
greater firepower and flexibility during conventional deployed by the early 1980s. We also project that the
and nuclear operations. Soviets will begin fielding a modified version with a
93. A probable replacement for the Scud, the SS-X- more flexible payload and improved accuracy shortly
23, is in an early stage of development. The first flight thereafter. As a result, we project a total force of about
test of this missile was observed in October 1977. This 300 mobile IRBM launchers from 1984 onward. About
system, which is expected to have improved accuracy 200 of these will be deployed in areas opposite NATO.
and reduced reaction time over the current Scud (See table VI-1.)
systems, could reach operational status by 1982. 98. Our force projections assume that the size of the
94. In the Pact tactical air forces, the potential for Long Range Aviation bomber force with a peripheral
nuclear delivery is expected to grow as the aircraft attack mission will remain about the same as at
modernization programs progress over the next dec- present. Some aging Badgers and Blinders probably
ade. In addition, the availability of low-yield warheads will be retired as Backfires are assigned to LRA in
and improved air-to-surface missile guidance systems increasing numbers. By the late 1980s about 270
could induce the Soviets to field an air-delivered Backfires could be in service with LRA if the rate of
tactical missile with a nuclear capability during the production increases as projected. One constraint be-
next few years. ing considered at the strategic arms limitation talks is a
VI--12

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.