Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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Top ______ strategic strike forces and to eliminate the imbalance 95. The number of pilots in Soviet units qualified to in battlefield nuclear capabilities they perceive in the drop nuclear bombs is also expected to grow, particu- European theater. Force improvements carried out to larly in the fighter-bomber regiments, as the level of date and ongoing deployment of new systems are pilot experience and proficiency increases and nuclear increasing the flexibility with which the Soviets can delivery training is broadened. We do not expect the employ their theater nuclear forces. In particular, they number of such pilots in the NSWP units to grow, are acquiring low-yield tactical nuclear weapons and however, because nuclear delivery training probably delivery systems with sufficient accuracy to permit will continue to be confined to a few specially desig- employment in close proximity to Pact forces. nated units. 91. Tactical Nuclear Forces. The Soviets will con- 96. The Soviets are expected to continue reequip- tinue to improve the quality of their tactical ballistic ping their heavy artillery brigades in the USSR with missile forces by deploying new missiles, introducing the nuclear-capable 203-mm self-propelled guns and improved guidance systems, and increasing the num- 240-mm self-propelled mortars. All six such brigades ber of weapons in tactical units. Deployment of the opposite NATO are expected to complete the reequip- SS-21, the replacement for the FROG division-level ping process within the next several years. It also weapon, will continue at least through the mid-1980s; seems likely that the Soviets will deploy some nuclear its deployment with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe artillery to Eastern Europe during the period of this could occur at any time. The deployment of the SS-22 Estimate. The Soviets probably have the technological as a replacement for the SS-12 front-level missile capability to develop a 152-mm nuclear artillery system also is probably under way and will continue round, but we have no reliable evidence that they until all 12 SS-12 brigades are reequipped. intend to develop and field such a weapon. 92. Increases in Soviet tactical missile forces oppo- 97. Peripheral Strategic Forces. The Soviets will site NATO are expected over the next several years. continue to rely heavily on land-based ballistic missiles Three Soviet Scud brigades in East Germany have to conduct strategic nuclear strikes in the areas sur- already been increased from 12 to 18 launchers. If all rounding the USSR. Some intercontinental ballistic Soviet Scud brigades in Eastern Europe are similarly missiles probably will continue to have peripheral augmented-as probably will be the case-the force missions, but the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic will have an additional 66 launchers, bringing the total missile will be the backbone of the peripheral force. there to 198 Scud launchers. We are unable to predict There is evidence that in late 1975 the Soviets were whether Scud brigades in the USSR will also be considering a plan to field a force of up to 28 SS-20 expanded. We have recent evidence that the Soviets regiments. Satellite photography of the support bases plan to increase the number of tactical missile launch- currently under construction indicates that eventually ers in their divisions from four to six as the SS-21 there will be at least nine SS-20 launchers per regi- replaces the FROG system. The increases in both Scud ment. We project a total force of 250 to 300 launchers, and SS-21 launchers would provide the Soviets with and we estimate that such a force could be fully greater firepower and flexibility during conventional deployed by the early 1980s. We also project that the and nuclear operations. Soviets will begin fielding a modified version with a 93. A probable replacement for the Scud, the SS-X- more flexible payload and improved accuracy shortly 23, is in an early stage of development. The first flight thereafter. As a result, we project a total force of about test of this missile was observed in October 1977. This 300 mobile IRBM launchers from 1984 onward. About system, which is expected to have improved accuracy 200 of these will be deployed in areas opposite NATO. and reduced reaction time over the current Scud (See table VI-1.) systems, could reach operational status by 1982. 98. Our force projections assume that the size of the 94. In the Pact tactical air forces, the potential for Long Range Aviation bomber force with a peripheral nuclear delivery is expected to grow as the aircraft attack mission will remain about the same as at modernization programs progress over the next dec- present. Some aging Badgers and Blinders probably ade. In addition, the availability of low-yield warheads will be retired as Backfires are assigned to LRA in and improved air-to-surface missile guidance systems increasing numbers. By the late 1980s about 270 could induce the Soviets to field an air-delivered Backfires could be in service with LRA if the rate of tactical missile with a nuclear capability during the production increases as projected. One constraint be- next few years. ing considered at the strategic arms limitation talks is a VI--12
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.