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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
bad weather. Therefore, we estimate that a new 87. The Soviets are testing several new surface-to-
helicopter with folding rotors and perhaps an all- air missile systems, some of which could have naval
weather capability will start to enter the force by the applications. The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced
82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS-NX-16 is an shorter range systems for individual ship defense
ASW weapon which uses a solid-fuel motor that ignites against low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles. There
under water. In testing it has carried a homing torpedo is evidence that the SA-X-10 land-launched SAM is
on a ballistic trajectory to a .maximum range of 54 being adapted for naval use. It would improve Soviet
nautical miles (100 kin). The missile has been in fleet air defenses against the low-altitude threat and
testing since the early 1970s and could become oper- may provide a significant improvement in range over
ational at any time. We expect it to be carried on current naval systems.
board the V-Il-class attack submarine. Submarines of 88. ASW Detection Systems. The Soviets will no
the C-II, T, and A classes are other possible platforms doubt make additional efforts to improve their surface
for this weapon. ship, submarine, and helicopter-borne sonars by de-
83. Antiship Missiles. We estimate that, by the creasing operating frequencies of passive systems,
early 1980s, the Soviets probably will introduce im- improving the signal structures of active systems and
proved cruise missiles as follow-ons to those developed improving the signal processing capabilities of both.
during the late 1960s. Work is currently under way on The Soviets also are investigating various nonacoustic
new surface- and submarine-launched missiles, possi- methods to detect a submarine by the effects caused
bly combining improved home-on-jam, infrared, and by its passage through the water or by contaminants
antiradiation seeker capabilities. from the submarine itself. These efforts include devel-
84. We have limited evidence that by 1985 a opment of air and shipborne sensors for detection of
follow-on to the SS-N-9 will be available for the surface thermal effects, detection of radioisotopes in
Nanuchka class and the projected PGG. This system the wake of submarines, detection of the wake itself,
probably will also be available in a submerged-launch and exploitation of low-frequency, electromagnetic
version for use on C-class submarines and their follow- radiations from submarines. We do not believe, how-
ons. In addition, the Soviets have in development a ever, that they will achieve any near-term technical
submerged-launched antiship cruise missile with an solution to their relative inability to locate Western
estimated range of 270 nm (500 km). It could be submarines in the open ocean.
available by the mid-1980s, but would require a new 89. Ocean Surveillance. A new ELINT ocean
and as yet unidentified submarine. The SS-N-12 cruise reconnaissance satellite (Eorsat) is now becoming oper-
missile system, which has a range of 300 nm (550 km), ational. It has a direction-finding capability with an
will likely be installed in some additional estimated accuracy of 2 to 20 nm (4 to 37 km),
E-i-class submarines-perhaps one-half the force- depending upon target location vis-a-vis the satellite. It
during normal overhaul periods. It is also possible that can transmit near-real-time tactical data to some
some J-class submarines and additional large surface Soviet ships and submarines operating in the same
combatants will receive the SS-N-12. general geographic area as the target. Western ships
85. We have no evidence that the Soviets are testing operating under conditions of electronic silence cannot
a new antiship air-to-surface missile (ASM), although be detected by this system. The Soviets can use a radar
they continue to test versions of tlhe AS-4 and AS-6. satellite (Rorsat) in conjunction with the Eorsat system.
Given past trends, however, the Soviets probably will The Rorsat is not affected by electronic silence but has
develop a new antiship ASM for the Backfire during only a limited area search capability and is unable to
the next several years. identify contacts. Neither system is kept continuously
in orbit. These two satellites probably will undergo
86. Air Defense Systems. Gatling gun systems and future development; the Soviets may be exploring
the 6-nm (11-km) SA-N-4 missile probably will con- alternative power sources to replace the nuclear one
tinue to be installed on most new naval ships for point used on the Rorsat system.
defense against aircraft and antiship missiles. These
weapons were even placed on board the new replen-
ishment oiler that became operational in late 1977, the Theater Nuclear Forces
first time an auxiliary has been equipped with a SAM 90. Over the next decade the Soviets will continue
system. their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.