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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
bad weather. Therefore, we estimate that a new 87. The Soviets are testing several new surface-to-
helicopter with folding rotors and perhaps an all- air missile systems, some of which could have naval
weather capability will start to enter the force by the applications. The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced
82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS-NX-16 is an shorter range systems for individual ship defense
ASW weapon which uses a solid-fuel motor that ignites against low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles. There
under water. In testing it has carried a homing torpedo is evidence that the SA-X-10 land-launched SAM is
on a ballistic trajectory to a .maximum range of 54 being adapted for naval use. It would improve Soviet
nautical miles (100 kin). The missile has been in fleet air defenses against the low-altitude threat and
testing since the early 1970s and could become oper- may provide a significant improvement in range over
ational at any time. We expect it to be carried on current naval systems.
board the V-Il-class attack submarine. Submarines of 88. ASW Detection Systems. The Soviets will no
the C-II, T, and A classes are other possible platforms doubt make additional efforts to improve their surface
for this weapon. ship, submarine, and helicopter-borne sonars by de-
83. Antiship Missiles. We estimate that, by the creasing operating frequencies of passive systems,
early 1980s, the Soviets probably will introduce im- improving the signal structures of active systems and
proved cruise missiles as follow-ons to those developed improving the signal processing capabilities of both.
during the late 1960s. Work is currently under way on The Soviets also are investigating various nonacoustic
new surface- and submarine-launched missiles, possi- methods to detect a submarine by the effects caused
bly combining improved home-on-jam, infrared, and by its passage through the water or by contaminants
antiradiation seeker capabilities. from the submarine itself. These efforts include devel-
84. We have limited evidence that by 1985 a opment of air and shipborne sensors for detection of
follow-on to the SS-N-9 will be available for the surface thermal effects, detection of radioisotopes in
Nanuchka class and the projected PGG. This system the wake of submarines, detection of the wake itself,
probably will also be available in a submerged-launch and exploitation of low-frequency, electromagnetic
version for use on C-class submarines and their follow- radiations from submarines. We do not believe, how-
ons. In addition, the Soviets have in development a ever, that they will achieve any near-term technical
submerged-launched antiship cruise missile with an solution to their relative inability to locate Western
estimated range of 270 nm (500 km). It could be submarines in the open ocean.
available by the mid-1980s, but would require a new 89. Ocean Surveillance. A new ELINT ocean
and as yet unidentified submarine. The SS-N-12 cruise reconnaissance satellite (Eorsat) is now becoming oper-
missile system, which has a range of 300 nm (550 km), ational. It has a direction-finding capability with an
will likely be installed in some additional estimated accuracy of 2 to 20 nm (4 to 37 km),
E-i-class submarines-perhaps one-half the force- depending upon target location vis-a-vis the satellite. It
during normal overhaul periods. It is also possible that can transmit near-real-time tactical data to some
some J-class submarines and additional large surface Soviet ships and submarines operating in the same
combatants will receive the SS-N-12. general geographic area as the target. Western ships
85. We have no evidence that the Soviets are testing operating under conditions of electronic silence cannot
a new antiship air-to-surface missile (ASM), although be detected by this system. The Soviets can use a radar
they continue to test versions of tlhe AS-4 and AS-6. satellite (Rorsat) in conjunction with the Eorsat system.
Given past trends, however, the Soviets probably will The Rorsat is not affected by electronic silence but has
develop a new antiship ASM for the Backfire during only a limited area search capability and is unable to
the next several years. identify contacts. Neither system is kept continuously
in orbit. These two satellites probably will undergo
86. Air Defense Systems. Gatling gun systems and future development; the Soviets may be exploring
the 6-nm (11-km) SA-N-4 missile probably will con- alternative power sources to replace the nuclear one
tinue to be installed on most new naval ships for point used on the Rorsat system.
defense against aircraft and antiship missiles. These
weapons were even placed on board the new replen-
ishment oiler that became operational in late 1977, the Theater Nuclear Forces
first time an auxiliary has been equipped with a SAM 90. Over the next decade the Soviets will continue
system. their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.