Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
bad weather. Therefore, we estimate that a new 87. The Soviets are testing several new surface-to- helicopter with folding rotors and perhaps an all- air missile systems, some of which could have naval weather capability will start to enter the force by the applications. The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS-NX-16 is an shorter range systems for individual ship defense ASW weapon which uses a solid-fuel motor that ignites against low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles. There under water. In testing it has carried a homing torpedo is evidence that the SA-X-10 land-launched SAM is on a ballistic trajectory to a .maximum range of 54 being adapted for naval use. It would improve Soviet nautical miles (100 kin). The missile has been in fleet air defenses against the low-altitude threat and testing since the early 1970s and could become oper- may provide a significant improvement in range over ational at any time. We expect it to be carried on current naval systems. board the V-Il-class attack submarine. Submarines of 88. ASW Detection Systems. The Soviets will no the C-II, T, and A classes are other possible platforms doubt make additional efforts to improve their surface for this weapon. ship, submarine, and helicopter-borne sonars by de- 83. Antiship Missiles. We estimate that, by the creasing operating frequencies of passive systems, early 1980s, the Soviets probably will introduce im- improving the signal structures of active systems and proved cruise missiles as follow-ons to those developed improving the signal processing capabilities of both. during the late 1960s. Work is currently under way on The Soviets also are investigating various nonacoustic new surface- and submarine-launched missiles, possi- methods to detect a submarine by the effects caused bly combining improved home-on-jam, infrared, and by its passage through the water or by contaminants antiradiation seeker capabilities. from the submarine itself. These efforts include devel- 84. We have limited evidence that by 1985 a opment of air and shipborne sensors for detection of follow-on to the SS-N-9 will be available for the surface thermal effects, detection of radioisotopes in Nanuchka class and the projected PGG. This system the wake of submarines, detection of the wake itself, probably will also be available in a submerged-launch and exploitation of low-frequency, electromagnetic version for use on C-class submarines and their follow- radiations from submarines. We do not believe, how- ons. In addition, the Soviets have in development a ever, that they will achieve any near-term technical submerged-launched antiship cruise missile with an solution to their relative inability to locate Western estimated range of 270 nm (500 km). It could be submarines in the open ocean. available by the mid-1980s, but would require a new 89. Ocean Surveillance. A new ELINT ocean and as yet unidentified submarine. The SS-N-12 cruise reconnaissance satellite (Eorsat) is now becoming oper- missile system, which has a range of 300 nm (550 km), ational. It has a direction-finding capability with an will likely be installed in some additional estimated accuracy of 2 to 20 nm (4 to 37 km), E-i-class submarines-perhaps one-half the force- depending upon target location vis-a-vis the satellite. It during normal overhaul periods. It is also possible that can transmit near-real-time tactical data to some some J-class submarines and additional large surface Soviet ships and submarines operating in the same combatants will receive the SS-N-12. general geographic area as the target. Western ships 85. We have no evidence that the Soviets are testing operating under conditions of electronic silence cannot a new antiship air-to-surface missile (ASM), although be detected by this system. The Soviets can use a radar they continue to test versions of tlhe AS-4 and AS-6. satellite (Rorsat) in conjunction with the Eorsat system. Given past trends, however, the Soviets probably will The Rorsat is not affected by electronic silence but has develop a new antiship ASM for the Backfire during only a limited area search capability and is unable to the next several years. identify contacts. Neither system is kept continuously in orbit. These two satellites probably will undergo 86. Air Defense Systems. Gatling gun systems and future development; the Soviets may be exploring the 6-nm (11-km) SA-N-4 missile probably will con- alternative power sources to replace the nuclear one tinue to be installed on most new naval ships for point used on the Rorsat system. defense against aircraft and antiship missiles. These weapons were even placed on board the new replen- ishment oiler that became operational in late 1977, the Theater Nuclear Forces first time an auxiliary has been equipped with a SAM 90. Over the next decade the Soviets will continue system. their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral VI-1 1
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.