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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
bad weather. Therefore, we estimate that a new 87. The Soviets are testing several new surface-to-
helicopter with folding rotors and perhaps an all- air missile systems, some of which could have naval
weather capability will start to enter the force by the applications. The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM
mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced
82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS-NX-16 is an shorter range systems for individual ship defense
ASW weapon which uses a solid-fuel motor that ignites against low-altitude aircraft and cruise missiles. There
under water. In testing it has carried a homing torpedo is evidence that the SA-X-10 land-launched SAM is
on a ballistic trajectory to a .maximum range of 54 being adapted for naval use. It would improve Soviet
nautical miles (100 kin). The missile has been in fleet air defenses against the low-altitude threat and
testing since the early 1970s and could become oper- may provide a significant improvement in range over
ational at any time. We expect it to be carried on current naval systems.
board the V-Il-class attack submarine. Submarines of 88. ASW Detection Systems. The Soviets will no
the C-II, T, and A classes are other possible platforms doubt make additional efforts to improve their surface
for this weapon. ship, submarine, and helicopter-borne sonars by de-
83. Antiship Missiles. We estimate that, by the creasing operating frequencies of passive systems,
early 1980s, the Soviets probably will introduce im- improving the signal structures of active systems and
proved cruise missiles as follow-ons to those developed improving the signal processing capabilities of both.
during the late 1960s. Work is currently under way on The Soviets also are investigating various nonacoustic
new surface- and submarine-launched missiles, possi- methods to detect a submarine by the effects caused
bly combining improved home-on-jam, infrared, and by its passage through the water or by contaminants
antiradiation seeker capabilities. from the submarine itself. These efforts include devel-
84. We have limited evidence that by 1985 a opment of air and shipborne sensors for detection of
follow-on to the SS-N-9 will be available for the surface thermal effects, detection of radioisotopes in
Nanuchka class and the projected PGG. This system the wake of submarines, detection of the wake itself,
probably will also be available in a submerged-launch and exploitation of low-frequency, electromagnetic
version for use on C-class submarines and their follow- radiations from submarines. We do not believe, how-
ons. In addition, the Soviets have in development a ever, that they will achieve any near-term technical
submerged-launched antiship cruise missile with an solution to their relative inability to locate Western
estimated range of 270 nm (500 km). It could be submarines in the open ocean.
available by the mid-1980s, but would require a new 89. Ocean Surveillance. A new ELINT ocean
and as yet unidentified submarine. The SS-N-12 cruise reconnaissance satellite (Eorsat) is now becoming oper-
missile system, which has a range of 300 nm (550 km), ational. It has a direction-finding capability with an
will likely be installed in some additional estimated accuracy of 2 to 20 nm (4 to 37 km),
E-i-class submarines-perhaps one-half the force- depending upon target location vis-a-vis the satellite. It
during normal overhaul periods. It is also possible that can transmit near-real-time tactical data to some
some J-class submarines and additional large surface Soviet ships and submarines operating in the same
combatants will receive the SS-N-12. general geographic area as the target. Western ships
85. We have no evidence that the Soviets are testing operating under conditions of electronic silence cannot
a new antiship air-to-surface missile (ASM), although be detected by this system. The Soviets can use a radar
they continue to test versions of tlhe AS-4 and AS-6. satellite (Rorsat) in conjunction with the Eorsat system.
Given past trends, however, the Soviets probably will The Rorsat is not affected by electronic silence but has
develop a new antiship ASM for the Backfire during only a limited area search capability and is unable to
the next several years. identify contacts. Neither system is kept continuously
in orbit. These two satellites probably will undergo
86. Air Defense Systems. Gatling gun systems and future development; the Soviets may be exploring
the 6-nm (11-km) SA-N-4 missile probably will con- alternative power sources to replace the nuclear one
tinue to be installed on most new naval ships for point used on the Rorsat system.
defense against aircraft and antiship missiles. These
weapons were even placed on board the new replen-
ishment oiler that became operational in late 1977, the Theater Nuclear Forces
first time an auxiliary has been equipped with a SAM 90. Over the next decade the Soviets will continue
system. their ongoing programs to improve their peripheral
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.