Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
their conventional force capabilities. Since the late 1960s they have significantly increased manpower, tanks, artillery, armed helicopters, and air defense. They have been equipping their tactical air forces with aircraft having increased performance and load-carrying capacity. During this period the flexibility and conventional war potential of Soviet naval forces also have been improved by the acquisition of more capable ships, submarines, and aircraft. (1, 37) 7. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to increase the size of their theater nuclear forces and improve their flexibility. Since the early 1970s they have introduced nuclear-capable artillery systems, have increased their surface-to-surface tactical missile launchers in Central Europe, have assigned nuclear missions to additional tactical aviation units, and are deploying a new-generation intermediate-range ballistic missile and a new bomber. The Soviet Navy has also added systems which improve its capability to wage theater nuclear war. (1, 39) 8. Pact theater forces have emerged from a decade of change with their fundamental orientation on the tank intact, but with a more balanced structure for conventional war and with both conventional and nuclear firepower greatly increased. These changes, along with an infusion of more modern technology, have made Soviet theater forces competitive with leading Western armies in sophistication of organiza- tion and equipment. (I, 43) 9. Our analysis of these developments permits the following additional conclusions: - The Soviets are aware of the improved technology and growing numbers of NATO antitank weapons, but this awareness has not led to any diminution of their tank forces or any major change in the way they see these forces performing. Indeed, they have made even further increases to their tank strength and have begun producing new tank models. (II, 7) - The Soviets are pursuing a vigorous program to increase the effectiveness of their air munitions to exploit the enhanced capabilities of their newer aircraft. The role of Frontal Aviation for delivering tactical nuclear weapons clearly is expanding. (II, 89 and 158) - The Soviet Navy in the past decade has significantly improved its capability to participate in a Pact-NATO war and now can undertake combat operations at greater distances from home waters. The introduction of new classes of submarines, Backfire bombers, and new missile systems has especially improved the Soviet Navy's strike capability against NATO surface forces. (II, 100) 8 Top i.c
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.