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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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some Kashin-class destroyers probably will continue to an ammunition support ship, and a repair ship. The
be converted to the Modified Kashin class, being pace of these programs, however, still lags the modern-
arrned with the SS-N-2c cruise missile. ization of the surface combat flect and will continue to
74. PatrolCombatants and Mine Warfare Units. be a factor retarding extended operations.
The capabilities and flexibility of minor combatants 78. Strike Aircraft. During the next several years
have been improved with the introduction of the TU-16 Badger aircraft armed with air-to-surface mis-
newer classes. Construction of the Nanuchka-class siles will remain numerically the greatest threat to
guided-missile patrol boat (PGG) probably will end in surface ships operating within 1,000 to 1,500 nautical
about 1980, at which time a new PGG class probably miles of the Soviet landmass, The Backfire, using a
will be introduced. Construction of the Matka-class variable flight profile and speeds near Mach 1.5 at
missile hydrofoils will probably continue at least high altitude, has a penetration capability against
through the 1980s. Construction of the Turya class aircraft carrier defenses significantly superior to that
(also a hydrofoil) of submarine chaser probably will of the Badger. The Backfire is currently being pro-
end in 1979, with a follow-on expected. New classes of duced at a rate of between two and three per month,
both are forecast for introduction in the early 1980s. and to date deployment has been nearly equal be-
We also believe that torpedo and patrol boats will be tween the Navy and Long Range Aviation. We project
gradually phased out of the Soviet Navy in favor of that production of the Backfire will continue into the
small antiship missile and ASW combatants. 1980s. A reconnaissance/ECM version could enter
service by the early 1980s," as could a new tanker
75. Amphibious Warfare. Current Soviet amphib- based on the IL-76 Candid, which could be capable of
ious ship programs include the new Ivan Rogov class supporting the Backfire. We believe that Soviet Naval
of amphibious landing ship and clock (LPD) and Aviation in the three western fleets will have about
continued acquisition of the Polish-built Ropucha-class 160 Backfires by 1988.
tank landing ship (LST). The 12,500-ton LPD can lift
a 500-man battalion landing team with its equipment . 79. Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft. The TU-142 Bear F
ithe only fixed-wing antisubmarine wvarfare aircraft
and carry about six helicopters and two or three air
cushion vehicles, while the 4,500-ton Ropucha prob- currently in production. We have evidence that a
ably can carry about 250 men and 16 tanks. At current variant, incorporating airframe modifications-seen on - - -
construction rates, the Soviets would add three or four several earlier models, may be nearing deployment.
of the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced marine vehicles
1980s. During this same period, we expect the Soviet operating in the surface effects zone, the Soviet Navy
inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the wing-in-ground (WIG)
(LSMs) to diminish by some 10 units, primarily by concept in an ASW application. A WIG ASW vehicle
transfer to other navies. In addition, East Germany is could enter naval service in the early 1980s.
building the 2,700-ton Frosch-class LST at the rate of 80. Fighter/Attack Aircraft. Approximately two
about three per year and the Soviets continue to to three YAK-36 Forger V/STOL (vertical and short
produce air cushion vehicles for use in amphibious takeoff and landing) aircraft are being produced per
assault. month, and production probably will continue until
76. We do not believe that these programs will have about 1980. A new or extensively modified V/STOL
a major impact on Soviet amphibious lift capabilities aircraft will probably enter production some time in
until the mid-1980s. By that time, however, Pact the early 1980s. SU-17 Fitters are still in production,
capabilities to lift amphibious forces in support of land and some of these attack aircraft have been assigned to
operations in Europe will significantly improve. the Baltic Fleet. We believe that the Navy will receive
about 60 SU-17s by 1983, and some of these may be
77. Auxiliaries. The Soviets are working to im- assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.
prove their underway replenishment capabilities. The
introduction of a new underway-replenishment ship of 81. Helicopters. The MI-14 Haze is the only naval
35,000 tons, for example, should improve the situation helicopter in production today. Its use aboard ships is
somewhat. This ship, which now is operational, has a limited, however, because it does not have folding
helicopter pad which also allows replenishment by air. rotors. The Soviets also lack an ASW helicopter which
In addition, a new type of cargo ship and a submarine can conduct dipping sonar operations at night or in
tender are under construction, and production of "See NIE 11-3/8-78 for a detailed discussion of present and
earlier types is continuing, including a water tender, future Backfire production.
VI-10

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.