Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

for short, intense engagements, some future construe- option which is more significant for the future of the
tion programs probably will feature ships of larger structure of the Navy than for the enhancement of
displacement which carry more fuel, ammunition, current military effectiveness.
provisions, and perhaps more crew space.
70. According to an alternative view,' the acquisi-
67. Two Kiev-class carriers are operational, and a tion of carriers with introduction of the Kiev clearly
third has been launched and will probably become constitutes a major watershed in the development of
operational in 1981. A fourth carrier of this class is the Soviet Navy. The holders of this view further
being built. We also have some information suggesting believe that the Kiev already has influenced the
that upon completion of the Kiev-class program the acquisition of other future surface combatants, and
Soviets will begin construction of a new and larger enhances Soviet antiship, ASW, and other capabilities
class of aircraft carrier, possibly incorporating an to an extent that could have significant influence on
arrested landing capability. Pact naval operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
68. The Kiev clearly has capabilities in ASW anid in The construction of the Kiev class and possibly a larger
other areas of naval warfare such as antiship strike, carrier class in the 1980s will provide added impetus
area air defense, and perhaps support for amphibious to the Soviet Navy's gradually expanding role in
attack. We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support to
overall value of the Kiev inasmuch as the capabilities amphibious operations.
of its aircraft are limited. It will take a long time for 71. There also is disagreement within the Intelli-
Soviet crews to become proficient in the complex gence Community regarding a large combatant-some
procedures of carrier flight operations and to develop 25,000 tons-which was launched in 1977 and is
appropriate tactics for carrier operations in conjunc- currently being fitted out at the Baltic shipyard in
tion with other ships. It is apparent that the Soviets Leningrad. A keel, probably for the second unit of the
have made a commitment to the construction of class, has been laid. According to one view,' the ship is
aircraft carriers, although general purpose submarine probably a nuclear-powered cruiser which will carry a
construction will absorb well over half of what the vertical-launch air defense missile system and a vari-
Central Intelligence Agency projects will be total ety of other antiship, antiair, and ASW weapons,
Soviet expenditures for general purpose ships and possibly including the SS-N-12. Another view 'a holds
submarines through the mid-1980s. that the evidence is still too ambiguous to classify the
69. There is disagreement within the Intelligence ship as to propulsion.
Community regarding the extent to which the Kiev 72. A new cruiser program has begun at the
enhances current Soviet military effectiveness and Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad. At least four ships of
regarding the impact of Soviet acquisition of carriers this class, slightly larger than the Kresta, are under
upon the evolution of naval missions. According to one construction. There are indications that this class will
view,' the introduction of the Kiev may constitute a mount large-caliber guns for gunfire support. The lead
major turning point in the development of the Soviet unit should become operational in 1981.
Navy, but it is premature to judge the impact of the
acquisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval 73. The Soviets probably will continue to build
missions. Some holders of this view' further believe Kara-class missile cruisers or heavily modified versions
that one, two, or three ships of this class, because of of this class at a rate of about one per year. The
I their limited capabilities to detect NATO submarines Krivak-class missile frigate probably will be produced
beyond torpedo attack range and to defend against at two or three per year until at least the early 1980s,
NATO air attack, do not by themselves represent a when its follow-on is expected. Grisha-class light frig-
significant improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight ates are being built at four per year, and the program
a war with NATO. It is apparent to the holders of this is expected to continue through 1980. In addition,
view that the Soviet naval leadership has chosen an - v The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
8 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; Navy.
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of * The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
State; and the Director, National Security Agency. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Navy.
Intelligence and Research, Department of State. * The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.
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