Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
for short, intense engagements, some future construe- option which is more significant for the future of the tion programs probably will feature ships of larger structure of the Navy than for the enhancement of displacement which carry more fuel, ammunition, current military effectiveness. provisions, and perhaps more crew space. 70. According to an alternative view,' the acquisi- 67. Two Kiev-class carriers are operational, and a tion of carriers with introduction of the Kiev clearly third has been launched and will probably become constitutes a major watershed in the development of operational in 1981. A fourth carrier of this class is the Soviet Navy. The holders of this view further being built. We also have some information suggesting believe that the Kiev already has influenced the that upon completion of the Kiev-class program the acquisition of other future surface combatants, and Soviets will begin construction of a new and larger enhances Soviet antiship, ASW, and other capabilities class of aircraft carrier, possibly incorporating an to an extent that could have significant influence on arrested landing capability. Pact naval operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. 68. The Kiev clearly has capabilities in ASW anid in The construction of the Kiev class and possibly a larger other areas of naval warfare such as antiship strike, carrier class in the 1980s will provide added impetus area air defense, and perhaps support for amphibious to the Soviet Navy's gradually expanding role in attack. We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support to overall value of the Kiev inasmuch as the capabilities amphibious operations. of its aircraft are limited. It will take a long time for 71. There also is disagreement within the Intelli- Soviet crews to become proficient in the complex gence Community regarding a large combatant-some procedures of carrier flight operations and to develop 25,000 tons-which was launched in 1977 and is appropriate tactics for carrier operations in conjunc- currently being fitted out at the Baltic shipyard in tion with other ships. It is apparent that the Soviets Leningrad. A keel, probably for the second unit of the have made a commitment to the construction of class, has been laid. According to one view,' the ship is aircraft carriers, although general purpose submarine probably a nuclear-powered cruiser which will carry a construction will absorb well over half of what the vertical-launch air defense missile system and a vari- Central Intelligence Agency projects will be total ety of other antiship, antiair, and ASW weapons, Soviet expenditures for general purpose ships and possibly including the SS-N-12. Another view 'a holds submarines through the mid-1980s. that the evidence is still too ambiguous to classify the 69. There is disagreement within the Intelligence ship as to propulsion. Community regarding the extent to which the Kiev 72. A new cruiser program has begun at the enhances current Soviet military effectiveness and Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad. At least four ships of regarding the impact of Soviet acquisition of carriers this class, slightly larger than the Kresta, are under upon the evolution of naval missions. According to one construction. There are indications that this class will view,' the introduction of the Kiev may constitute a mount large-caliber guns for gunfire support. The lead major turning point in the development of the Soviet unit should become operational in 1981. Navy, but it is premature to judge the impact of the acquisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval 73. The Soviets probably will continue to build missions. Some holders of this view' further believe Kara-class missile cruisers or heavily modified versions that one, two, or three ships of this class, because of of this class at a rate of about one per year. The I their limited capabilities to detect NATO submarines Krivak-class missile frigate probably will be produced beyond torpedo attack range and to defend against at two or three per year until at least the early 1980s, NATO air attack, do not by themselves represent a when its follow-on is expected. Grisha-class light frig- significant improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight ates are being built at four per year, and the program a war with NATO. It is apparent to the holders of this is expected to continue through 1980. In addition, view that the Soviet naval leadership has chosen an - v The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the 8 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; Navy. the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of * The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence State; and the Director, National Security Agency. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Navy. Intelligence and Research, Department of State. * The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency. VI-9 Top et-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.