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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
for short, intense engagements, some future construe- option which is more significant for the future of the
tion programs probably will feature ships of larger structure of the Navy than for the enhancement of
displacement which carry more fuel, ammunition, current military effectiveness.
provisions, and perhaps more crew space.
70. According to an alternative view,' the acquisi-
67. Two Kiev-class carriers are operational, and a tion of carriers with introduction of the Kiev clearly
third has been launched and will probably become constitutes a major watershed in the development of
operational in 1981. A fourth carrier of this class is the Soviet Navy. The holders of this view further
being built. We also have some information suggesting believe that the Kiev already has influenced the
that upon completion of the Kiev-class program the acquisition of other future surface combatants, and
Soviets will begin construction of a new and larger enhances Soviet antiship, ASW, and other capabilities
class of aircraft carrier, possibly incorporating an to an extent that could have significant influence on
arrested landing capability. Pact naval operations in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
68. The Kiev clearly has capabilities in ASW anid in The construction of the Kiev class and possibly a larger
other areas of naval warfare such as antiship strike, carrier class in the 1980s will provide added impetus
area air defense, and perhaps support for amphibious to the Soviet Navy's gradually expanding role in
attack. We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support to
overall value of the Kiev inasmuch as the capabilities amphibious operations.
of its aircraft are limited. It will take a long time for 71. There also is disagreement within the Intelli-
Soviet crews to become proficient in the complex gence Community regarding a large combatant-some
procedures of carrier flight operations and to develop 25,000 tons-which was launched in 1977 and is
appropriate tactics for carrier operations in conjunc- currently being fitted out at the Baltic shipyard in
tion with other ships. It is apparent that the Soviets Leningrad. A keel, probably for the second unit of the
have made a commitment to the construction of class, has been laid. According to one view,' the ship is
aircraft carriers, although general purpose submarine probably a nuclear-powered cruiser which will carry a
construction will absorb well over half of what the vertical-launch air defense missile system and a vari-
Central Intelligence Agency projects will be total ety of other antiship, antiair, and ASW weapons,
Soviet expenditures for general purpose ships and possibly including the SS-N-12. Another view 'a holds
submarines through the mid-1980s. that the evidence is still too ambiguous to classify the
69. There is disagreement within the Intelligence ship as to propulsion.
Community regarding the extent to which the Kiev 72. A new cruiser program has begun at the
enhances current Soviet military effectiveness and Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad. At least four ships of
regarding the impact of Soviet acquisition of carriers this class, slightly larger than the Kresta, are under
upon the evolution of naval missions. According to one construction. There are indications that this class will
view,' the introduction of the Kiev may constitute a mount large-caliber guns for gunfire support. The lead
major turning point in the development of the Soviet unit should become operational in 1981.
Navy, but it is premature to judge the impact of the
acquisition of carriers upon the evolution of naval 73. The Soviets probably will continue to build
missions. Some holders of this view' further believe Kara-class missile cruisers or heavily modified versions
that one, two, or three ships of this class, because of of this class at a rate of about one per year. The
I their limited capabilities to detect NATO submarines Krivak-class missile frigate probably will be produced
beyond torpedo attack range and to defend against at two or three per year until at least the early 1980s,
NATO air attack, do not by themselves represent a when its follow-on is expected. Grisha-class light frig-
significant improvement in Soviet capabilities to fight ates are being built at four per year, and the program
a war with NATO. It is apparent to the holders of this is expected to continue through 1980. In addition,
view that the Soviet naval leadership has chosen an - v The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
8 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; Navy.
the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of * The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
State; and the Director, National Security Agency. Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director, Bureau of Navy.
Intelligence and Research, Department of State. * The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.