Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top t however, to be greater in areas closer to the Soviet purpose submarine output will increase to at least homeland than in the open ocean. Although there are eight and possibly 10 units annually over the next few gaps in our knowledge of Soviet ASW developments, years as newly identified construction programs pro- we have no evidence of any major breakthrough that ceed and some ballistic missile units are converted to would give the Soviets confidence in their ability to attack submarines. neutralize Western submarines in the open ocean. 63. These new programs probably will include fol- 59. The Soviets are also committed to protecting low-ons to the C-II nuclear-powered guided-missile their own submarines from NATO naval forces, par- submarine (SSGN), the V-II nuclear-powered attack ticularly their D-class SSBNs operating in the Barents submarine (SSN), and possibly the A-class SSN. If and Norwegian Seas and other areas. pressure hulls are fabricated from HY-130 equivalent steel, the operational depth limit for the new SSNs probably will be to as much as 470 meters, as com- We expect the Soviets to continue working to improve pared with about 360 meters for present classes. If their capabilities to support and protect their SSBNs. titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one 60. Support for ground forces in the context of a intelligence estimate,' the maximum speeds for some general European war will continue to be an impor- of the new SSN and SSGN classes could reach 37 knots. tant mission of the Soviet Navy's general purpose Another view l holds that these submarines will be forces. In addition to protecting the seaward flanks of capable of speeds of up to 33 knots. We believe the the ground forces from attack by enemy sea-based air classes projected for the late 1970s or early 1980s will or naval forces or by enemy amphibious assaults, the ntbesgicalyqeerhncuetsbmie.not be significantly quieter than current submarines. Navy has the role of providing gunfire support for ground forces and launching amphibious operations 64. Many operational diesel torpedo and cruise against enemy flanks. This role will have some influ- missile units will be reaching the end of their useful ence, albeit limited, on the future composition and age by about 1980. We believe the T-class diesel force levels of the fleets. Some older units will be submarines will remain in production for several retained and some new systems, including air-cushion years, gradually replacing the F-class in open-ocean vehicles and hydrofoils, will be allocated to these flank operations. support missions. 65. During the next decade we estimate that the 61. Soviet capabilities to interdict NATO's sea lines number of diesel submarines will decrease from about of communication (SLOG) by attacking ships at sea 170 to about 85 as older units are replaced on a less and by mining and airstrikes against European port than one-for-one basis; nuclear attack submarines will facilities probably also will improve. This will result increase from 43 to about-75; nuclear cruise missile from the increased capabilities that will likely exist in submarines will increase from 44 to about 55. Thus, future Soviet general purpose submarines, mine war- the total number of general purpose submarines will fare ships, and naval aircraft. Some agencies believe, decrease by about 15 percent-from 257 to about 215. however, that Soviet capabilities to perform this mis- Because a greater proportion of the force will be sion will nonetheless remain limited. Other agencies nuclear, however, there will be a significant increase believe that Soviet capabilities for SLOC interdiction in overall capabilities. currently are and will continue to be significant6C 66. Principal Surface Combatants. The Soviets 62. General Purpose Submarines. During the past currently have at least six construction programs under few years, Soviet construction programs for torpedo way for principal surface combatants, including air- attack and cruise missile submarines have produced an craft carriers. The principal surface combatants are average of about five units per year, which is below expected to decrease in number over the next decade estimated shipyard capacity. Because older subma- but to grow in firepower and in capability for pro- rines have been retired at a greater rate than new ones longed deployment and combat. While most warships have been produced, overall force levels have been produced in the USSR to date appear to be optimized declining. We estimate, however, that overall general This estimate was made by the Director, Defense Intelligence For a discussion of differing views on Soviet intentions and Agency, and the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the capabilities to interdict NATO's sea lines of communications, see Navy. paragraphs 142-149 of chapter if and 168 and 169 of chapter IV. . The holder of this view is the Central Intelligence Agency. Vl-8 o ret
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.