Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top 51, A new transport, the AN-72, will probably be General Purpose Naval Forces operational in Frontal Aviation units in the early 55. During the next decade, developments in the 1980s. This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved operations from unimproved airfields, will enable capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime cargo and personnel to be delivered close to deployed missions. The Soviets will also press forward with field forces. programs to correct shortcomings in submarine detec- 52. NSWP National Air Defense.' We have good tion, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communi- evidence that non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries plan cations. Indeed, developments over the past decade to undertake a major program to reequip their na- have been so rapid that a period of time may be tional air defense forces, The program is scheduled to required to integrate and consolidate advances and run into the mid-1980s and is designed to remedy ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We what the Pact considers to be the growing obsolescence expect a modest decline in the overall number of of its surface-to-air missile and interceptor forces. Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines but Though intended primarily to improve defense against newer and more capable units will be replacing older low-altitude targets, the modernization effort would and less effective ones. also entail the introduction of systems that would . 56. We expect the Soviet Navy within the next extend the range and ceilings at which targets could be decade to continue concentrating on the missions engaged. outlined in chapter II. We also anticipate that its 53. The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas and to be reequipped with newer radars having improved support of Soviet overseas policies will continue to capabilities for target information handling and data evolve. Improvements in antiship, amphibious, and transmission and greater resistance to electronic coun- antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are also termeasures. Some Pact countries might also receive likely. Moreover, we foresee that by the mid-1980s the radar-equipped ships or possibly aircraft to extend Soviets will have made some progress in such current early warning coverage over water approaches to Pact problem areas as logistic support and the ability to territory. NSWP SA-2 and SA-3 systems are to be conduct sustained operations. The result of this process upgraded with equipment more resistant to electronic will- be a somewhat more capable Navy which-will - jamming and possessing better capabilities to engage remain an integral element of Pact planning for war in targets with small radar cross-sections. The SA-5, a Europe. We believe, however, the Soviets will con- long-range SAM system that has heretofore been de- tinue to have problems in detecting enemy subma- ployed only in the USSR, is also being considered for rines, in defending their surface ships against air deployment in some NSWP countries. The most no- attack, in providing targeting assistance for the effec- table development affecting Pact interceptor forces tive use of many ASW and antiship weapons, and in would be the continued introduction of Floggers replenishing ships at sea. equipped with a fire-control radar providing a limited 57. The Soviet Navy will also continue to devote lookdown/shootdown capability. While this aircraft resources and develop tactics for preventing the ap- and late-model Fishbeds will be the mainstay of the proach of NATO's carrier task forces or other major force, Pact planners are also considering equipping surface ship formations into waters contiguous to the some NSWP interceptor units with the MIG-25 European theater. As new cruise-missile-equipped Foxbat. ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced, 54. Our evidence of Pact plans to deploy the we expect the Soviet capabilities against those NATO Foxbat and SA-5 with the NSWP air defense forces forces to improve. Reliance on external targeting will, indicates that both would be intended primarily to however, remain a serious deficiency in beyond-the- counter the growing capabilities of NATO's air forces horizon attacks. for standoff air-to-surface missile attack. The evidence also suggests that these systems might be used to 58. Antisubmarine warfare will remain a serious engage such NATO aircraft as the E-3A AWACS concern of the Soviet naval leadership. Soviet ASW (airborne warning and control system). capabilities will improve somewhat with the acquisi- tion of new classes of surface ships, submarines, and 'See NIE 11-3/8-78 for a discussion of the Soviet strategic air aircraft and as, new technology and better operating defense forces. techniques take hold. These capabilities will continue, VI-7 Top ioL
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.