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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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51, A new transport, the AN-72, will probably be General Purpose Naval Forces
operational in Frontal Aviation units in the early 55. During the next decade, developments in the
1980s. This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved
operations from unimproved airfields, will enable capabilities to perform its peacetime and wartime
cargo and personnel to be delivered close to deployed missions. The Soviets will also press forward with
field forces. programs to correct shortcomings in submarine detec-
52. NSWP National Air Defense.' We have good tion, fleet air defense, logistic support, and communi-
evidence that non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries plan cations. Indeed, developments over the past decade
to undertake a major program to reequip their na- have been so rapid that a period of time may be
tional air defense forces, The program is scheduled to required to integrate and consolidate advances and
run into the mid-1980s and is designed to remedy ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We
what the Pact considers to be the growing obsolescence expect a modest decline in the overall number of
of its surface-to-air missile and interceptor forces. Soviet general purpose naval ships and submarines but
Though intended primarily to improve defense against newer and more capable units will be replacing older
low-altitude targets, the modernization effort would and less effective ones.
also entail the introduction of systems that would . 56. We expect the Soviet Navy within the next
extend the range and ceilings at which targets could be decade to continue concentrating on the missions
engaged. outlined in chapter II. We also anticipate that its
53. The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas and
to be reequipped with newer radars having improved support of Soviet overseas policies will continue to
capabilities for target information handling and data evolve. Improvements in antiship, amphibious, and
transmission and greater resistance to electronic coun- antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are also
termeasures. Some Pact countries might also receive likely. Moreover, we foresee that by the mid-1980s the
radar-equipped ships or possibly aircraft to extend Soviets will have made some progress in such current
early warning coverage over water approaches to Pact problem areas as logistic support and the ability to
territory. NSWP SA-2 and SA-3 systems are to be conduct sustained operations. The result of this process
upgraded with equipment more resistant to electronic will- be a somewhat more capable Navy which-will -
jamming and possessing better capabilities to engage remain an integral element of Pact planning for war in
targets with small radar cross-sections. The SA-5, a Europe. We believe, however, the Soviets will con-
long-range SAM system that has heretofore been de- tinue to have problems in detecting enemy subma-
ployed only in the USSR, is also being considered for rines, in defending their surface ships against air
deployment in some NSWP countries. The most no- attack, in providing targeting assistance for the effec-
table development affecting Pact interceptor forces tive use of many ASW and antiship weapons, and in
would be the continued introduction of Floggers replenishing ships at sea.
equipped with a fire-control radar providing a limited 57. The Soviet Navy will also continue to devote
lookdown/shootdown capability. While this aircraft resources and develop tactics for preventing the ap-
and late-model Fishbeds will be the mainstay of the proach of NATO's carrier task forces or other major
force, Pact planners are also considering equipping surface ship formations into waters contiguous to the
some NSWP interceptor units with the MIG-25 European theater. As new cruise-missile-equipped
Foxbat. ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable
units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced,
54. Our evidence of Pact plans to deploy the we expect the Soviet capabilities against those NATO
Foxbat and SA-5 with the NSWP air defense forces forces to improve. Reliance on external targeting will,
indicates that both would be intended primarily to however, remain a serious deficiency in beyond-the-
counter the growing capabilities of NATO's air forces horizon attacks.
for standoff air-to-surface missile attack. The evidence
also suggests that these systems might be used to 58. Antisubmarine warfare will remain a serious
engage such NATO aircraft as the E-3A AWACS concern of the Soviet naval leadership. Soviet ASW
(airborne warning and control system). capabilities will improve somewhat with the acquisi-
tion of new classes of surface ships, submarines, and
'See NIE 11-3/8-78 for a discussion of the Soviet strategic air aircraft and as, new technology and better operating
defense forces. techniques take hold. These capabilities will continue,
VI-7
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.