Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
- iop-%ert aircraft currently being tested are known to have such directed toward fielding advanced air-launched cruise a capability. Whatever in-flight refueling capability missiles for delivery by Soviet Long Range Aviation the Soviets develop for their tactical aircraft during bombers are also under way. the period of this Estimate, therefore, is likely to be confined to only a small portion of the force. 46. We have no evidence that the Soviets have operational precision guided bombs but they are con- 40. The Soviets will no doubt pursue improvements ducting tests of unpowered, airdropped vehicles that in the range and all-weather, day or night, low-level exhibit precision-delivery characteristics. These tests attack capabilities of the Pact's ground attack forces. indicate that a guided bomb employing a laser illu- We also expect increased use of ECM (electronic minator mounted on board the launch aircraft could countermeasures) pods and other ECM equipment, be available in the near future, and that a TV-guided which should enhance survivability in hostile airspace. bomb could become operational in the early 1980s. These systems would be accurate within 10 to 20 4. Reconnaissance. Modernization in the recon- mee naissance component of the Pact's tactical air forces meters. will continue during the next few years. Deployment 47. The Soviets are developing a minimum of two of Foxbat B/D aircraft to Soviet reconnaissance units new tactical air-to-surface missiles, the AS-X-11 and will proceed, and reconnaissance variants of the Flog- AS-X-12, with operational ranges of about 40 to 30 ger and Fencer could appear in the early 1980s. kilometers respectively. These new antiradiation hom- Improved systems for data processing and transmission ing missiles will probably be deployed by 1980. They are also expected. will have improved accuracy-within 12 meters-and 42. Helicopter Forces. We expect in the next are expected to lock on targets more quickly than decade that several additional Soviet, Czechoslovak, previous systems. The AS-X-11 can be targeted against Polish, and East German combat helicopter regiments, EW/ECI and ground-based air defense (SAM) radars. primarily for ground attack, will be formed. The The AS-X-12 can be targeted only against ground-. NSWP regiments probably will be patterned after based air defense (SAM) radars. The Soviets are also SWPie regiments probmalywilbeequippatternedexpected to begin testing a TV-guided version of their Soviet regiments and may be equipped with MI-24 lIind armed helicopters. The Romanians may also A- in the near future. organize a combat helicopter regiment in the next five 48. We have no evidence that the Soviets are years, using attack and transport helicopters of French developing a new air-to-air missile for their tactical design- fighters. Development of new missiles for the strategic 43. The Soviets are applying their latest technology air defense forces, however, could have some future in avionics and air ordnance to helicopter platforms. applications in the tactical air forces. This could result in improvements to their weapon systems to increase standoff ranges and enhance the 49. Military Air Transport. Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue to be modernized defense environment. In addition to assigning broader with newer aircraft, but the size of the force will not ground attack roles to helicopters, the Soviets are appreciably change. Although overall lift capacity will expected to equip them to a greater extent for coi- increase, the Soviets do not appear to be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much more The Soviets are also increasing the air-to-air combat than one airborne division or the assault elements of two divisions. training of MI-24 Hind crews. 44. The Soviets are developing a new heavy lift 50. The AN-12 Cub medium-range transport will helicopter, the Halo A. This helicopter is assessed to remain the mainstay of the airlift force, at least into have almost twice the payload of the current Hook the mid-1980s, although its numbers will continue to and Ilarke heavy lift helicopters. The new helicopter decrease as the IL-76 Candid enters the force. The has twin engines and an eight-blade main rotor, and Soviets will continue to rely on the AN-22 Cock, which could be operational by the early 1980s. is no longer in production, to lift outsized military equipment. We also expect the Soviets to continue 45. Air Munitions. The Soviets also are developing relying on Aeroflot for airlift augmentation, and this more advanced air-to-air missiles, tactical air-to-sur- capability will increase as the civil air fleet is face missiles, and precision guided bombs. Programs modernized. VI-6 IToepcret
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.