Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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I ret main improvements over the SA-6 will be the integra- modernization will continue to proceed gradually and tion of the target-tracking radar and missile launcher be driven largely by economic considerations. in a single unit, greater mobility, better capabilities for 35. Fighters. Production of the MIG-23 Flogger electronic counter-countermeasures (EGCCM), and a probably will continue well into the 1980s. A variant multiple-target-handling capability. A possible follow- of the Flogger with an improved radar designed to on to the SA-4 is also being tested and is expected to ducton ithnte net treeor our give it a better low-altitude mntercept capability is enter series production withm the next three or four years. It probably will also have a multiple-target- .en eeoe n oldb elydwt h yars.gIpoablity. wSoviet tactical air forces by the early 1980s. Production handling capability. of MIG-21 Fishbed variants is also expected to con- 32. Tactical Ballistic Missiles. Surface-to-surface tinue at least into the early 1980s. NSWP tactical ballistic missiles are expected to play an increasingly fighter units are expected to receive mainly Floggers important role in Warsaw Pact planning for conven- and late-model Fishbeds over the next decade. tional combat during the period of this Estimate. New missiles such as the SS-21 have characteristics that give . L t capabilities could arise from the introduction of a them a significant conventional capability. The SS-21, ttlynwarrf.TeSvesaetsiga es for example, could be used effectively with improved totll new ar The oietae ingrat le convntinaluniionsin n ar deens supresion three new or highly modified fighter-type aircraft, oneconventional munitions in an air defense suppression of which is intended for deployment with the Soviet role. In such a role, tactical missiles offer the advan- ofrwhic is intene for Shelo eith th o strategic air defense forces. Should either or both of tages of tactical surprise and assured penetrability, but the other aircraft be deployed with the tactical forces, they require timely and accurate reconnaissance data. they would not be available in significant numbers Near the end of the period of this Estimate, tactical teyoul not baib m g cn u e ballistic missiles equipped with terminal guidance and conventional, earth-penetrating munitions could pose 37. Ground Attack Aircraft. We expect deploy- a serious threat to NATO airfields. ment of a new ground attack aircraft-designated the SU-25-with the Soviet Air Force by 1980 and believe 33 .Bth .i-90 h oit ol nrdc that it will be purchased by some NSWP countries. tactical ballistic rmissiles equipped with terminal homn- thtiwllbpucaebysmNSPonre. The SU-25 is a twin-engine, subsonic, heavily armored ing systems. We lack information on the specific types aircraft, presumably designed for close air support of of terminal guidance systems the Soviets might de- velop, but at ranges of 1,000 kilometers or less, they ground forces. The aircraft apparently does not incor- should be able to achieve accuracies with a CEP porate advanced technology and is considerably slower (circular error probable) of about 50 meters or less. We and has a shorter combat radius than the SU-17 Fitter believe that the Soviets will introduce terminal homing C/D ard MIG-27 Flogger D. But it will be armed with in their division-level missiles first, possibly in a guns, rockets, bombs, and tactical air-to-surface mis- modification to the SS-21, because Soviet terminal siles, and will almost certainly handle better at low homing technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these shorter range systems. 38. Soviet ground attack units opposite NATO will be totally equipped with newer aircraft-SU-25, Flog- Air Forces ger D, Fitter C/D, and Fencer-by the early 1980s. Within five years over one-half of the aircraft in 34. We believe that the number of fixed-wing NSWP ground attack units probably will be more aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will modern types. The SU-25 and Flogger will be the remain essentially unchanged over the next decade. main ground attack aircraft in NSWP air forces by the Efforts to improve the quality of Soviet tactical air- end of the next decade. craft and munitions are likely to continue, although the rate of new aircraft deployment is expected to 39. We have evidence that the Soviets are testing an slow as the Soviets meet their current force objectives. air-to-air refueling capability for the SU-24 Fencer Furthermore, we expect the Soviets to continue im- and future variants of this aircraft, and possibly others proving their support and subsidiary systems such as could be so equipped. No operational Soviet tactical command and control, radioclectronic combat (REC), aircraft are currently capable of in-flight refueling, and reconnaissance data link systems. No major nor do the Soviets have an adequate tanker force to changes are expected in the number of fixed-wing support large-scale use of air-to-air refueling by their aircraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP equipment tactical air forces. Moreover, none of the new model VI-5 Topdsee
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.