Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

I ret
main improvements over the SA-6 will be the integra- modernization will continue to proceed gradually and
tion of the target-tracking radar and missile launcher be driven largely by economic considerations.
in a single unit, greater mobility, better capabilities for 35. Fighters. Production of the MIG-23 Flogger
electronic counter-countermeasures (EGCCM), and a probably will continue well into the 1980s. A variant
multiple-target-handling capability. A possible follow- of the Flogger with an improved radar designed to
on to the SA-4 is also being tested and is expected to
ducton ithnte net treeor our give it a better low-altitude mntercept capability is
enter series production withm the next three or four
years. It probably will also have a multiple-target- .en eeoe n oldb elydwt h
yars.gIpoablity. wSoviet tactical air forces by the early 1980s. Production
handling capability. of MIG-21 Fishbed variants is also expected to con-
32. Tactical Ballistic Missiles. Surface-to-surface tinue at least into the early 1980s. NSWP tactical
ballistic missiles are expected to play an increasingly fighter units are expected to receive mainly Floggers
important role in Warsaw Pact planning for conven- and late-model Fishbeds over the next decade.
tional combat during the period of this Estimate. New
missiles such as the SS-21 have characteristics that give . L t
capabilities could arise from the introduction of a
them a significant conventional capability. The SS-21, ttlynwarrf.TeSvesaetsiga es
for example, could be used effectively with improved totll new ar The oietae ingrat le
convntinaluniionsin n ar deens supresion three new or highly modified fighter-type aircraft, oneconventional munitions in an air defense suppression of which is intended for deployment with the Soviet
role. In such a role, tactical missiles offer the advan- ofrwhic is intene for Shelo eith th o
strategic air defense forces. Should either or both of
tages of tactical surprise and assured penetrability, but the other aircraft be deployed with the tactical forces,
they require timely and accurate reconnaissance data. they would not be available in significant numbers
Near the end of the period of this Estimate, tactical teyoul not baib m g cn u e
ballistic missiles equipped with terminal guidance and
conventional, earth-penetrating munitions could pose 37. Ground Attack Aircraft. We expect deploy-
a serious threat to NATO airfields. ment of a new ground attack aircraft-designated the
SU-25-with the Soviet Air Force by 1980 and believe
33 .Bth .i-90 h oit ol nrdc that it will be purchased by some NSWP countries.
tactical ballistic rmissiles equipped with terminal homn- thtiwllbpucaebysmNSPonre.
The SU-25 is a twin-engine, subsonic, heavily armored
ing systems. We lack information on the specific types aircraft, presumably designed for close air support of
of terminal guidance systems the Soviets might de-
velop, but at ranges of 1,000 kilometers or less, they ground forces. The aircraft apparently does not incor-
should be able to achieve accuracies with a CEP porate advanced technology and is considerably slower
(circular error probable) of about 50 meters or less. We and has a shorter combat radius than the SU-17 Fitter
believe that the Soviets will introduce terminal homing C/D ard MIG-27 Flogger D. But it will be armed with
in their division-level missiles first, possibly in a guns, rockets, bombs, and tactical air-to-surface mis-
modification to the SS-21, because Soviet terminal siles, and will almost certainly handle better at low
homing technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers.
for these shorter range systems. 38. Soviet ground attack units opposite NATO will
be totally equipped with newer aircraft-SU-25, Flog-
Air Forces ger D, Fitter C/D, and Fencer-by the early 1980s.
Within five years over one-half of the aircraft in
34. We believe that the number of fixed-wing NSWP ground attack units probably will be more
aircraft in Soviet Frontal Aviation opposite NATO will modern types. The SU-25 and Flogger will be the
remain essentially unchanged over the next decade. main ground attack aircraft in NSWP air forces by the
Efforts to improve the quality of Soviet tactical air- end of the next decade.
craft and munitions are likely to continue, although
the rate of new aircraft deployment is expected to 39. We have evidence that the Soviets are testing an
slow as the Soviets meet their current force objectives. air-to-air refueling capability for the SU-24 Fencer
Furthermore, we expect the Soviets to continue im- and future variants of this aircraft, and possibly others
proving their support and subsidiary systems such as could be so equipped. No operational Soviet tactical
command and control, radioclectronic combat (REC), aircraft are currently capable of in-flight refueling,
and reconnaissance data link systems. No major nor do the Soviets have an adequate tanker force to
changes are expected in the number of fixed-wing support large-scale use of air-to-air refueling by their
aircraft in the NSWP air forces. NSWP equipment tactical air forces. Moreover, none of the new model
VI-5
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