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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Top et
23. Artillery. Pact concern with increasing conven- terable mines and, while it is unlikely that such mines
tional firepower in general and with the neutralization are currently with Pact artillery units, we believe that
of NATO antitank defense in particular is expected to they will be introduced by the mid-1980s.
result in continued increases in numbers of artillery 27. Antitank Weapons. Soviet R&D programs for
pieces as well as improvements in weapons, target
acquisition capabilities, and ammunition. The upgrad-
ing of the artillery battery in the Soviet motorized rifle ment of missile systems incorporating semiautomatic
or automatic guidance to relieve the gunner of guid-
regiment to an artillery battalion-a measure already
, ance responsibility, thereby increasing hit probabilities
and reducing gunner vulnerability. These programs
bility to suppress or neutralize antitank weapons as are expected to result in the fielding of a short-to-
well as other targets. As towed artillery is replaced by medium-range man-portable system by the mid-1980s
self-propelled (SP) models (with their own armored and a similar heliborne system somewhat earlier.
command and reconnaissance vehicles) this capability These systems probably will have increased accuracy
will grow further because the newer systems have and warhead effectiveness. The heliborne system
better mobility, are more responsive, and provide and wha veess. veloy.
better crew protection. By the early 1980s, battalions
of 122-mm SP weapons probably will be found in all 28. Armored Personnel Carriers. Production of
Soviet BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments and both the BMP and the BTR-60 is expected to continue
May also appear in some BTR-equipped regiments at a steady pace. Soviet motorized rifle divisions are
and division artillery regiments. expected to standardize during the 1980s on a mix of
24. Deployment of other SP artillery weapons will one motorized rifle regiment equipped with the BMP
also proceed over the next decade. The new nuclear and two with the BTR-60PB. The motorized rifle
SP heavy artillery (203-mm guns and 240-mm mor- regiment in tank divisions will be equipped with the
tars) will continue to replace older towed weapons in BMP. The East German Army has this same organiza-
Soviet heavy artillery brigades and may supplement or tion, while the Czechoslovaks have one field army
replace lighter weapons in army artillery regiments equipped according to the Soviet pattern and another
and in artillery divisions. If the new heavy artillery in process. Poland has only about 300 BMPs and is
pieces are deployed to the Soviet groups of forces, as expected to equip no more than one additional motor-
we believe likely, it would break NATO's monopoly ized rifle regiment per year with them. The remainder
on nuclear tube artillery in Central Europe and will continue to use older models. A follow-on to the
provide the Pact with a capability to respond in kind BTR-60PB, designated the BTR-70, is in production
to NATO's use of nuclear tube artillery and to provide and is being assigned to units. These changes will
close-in nuclear strikes in support of ground forces. improve the general mobility of Pact ground forces, as
well as their capabilities for operating in a chemical,
25. NSWP artillery improvements will lag behind biological, or radiological environment.
those of the Soviets. Only a few batteries of the new SP
guns and no heavy artillery are in service in the NSWP 29. Ground Force Air Defense Systems. The
forces. The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances which they
Czechoslovak, and Polish Armies will increase, but have made in air defense weapons over the last
towed models will continue to predominate. decade. Existing systems will no doubt undergo modi-
fication and improvements. The SA-9, for example,
26. We have fair evidence that the Soviets are currently mounted on a scout car chassis, will probably
working toward development of improved conven- be deployed on a light tracked amphibious carrier that
tional munitions (ICMs) for their tube artillery sys- would increase its mobility as well as provide more
temns. The Soviets have the technology to develop internal storage space for refire missiles.
ICMs for their artillery pieces of 152-mm or larger 30. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected in the
caliber, but we have not observed them in testing. We 30. a fl- to the Zepe the
estimate, however, that by the mid-1980s the Soviets next decade, but probably not before the mid-1980s.
will field ICMs with their larger caliber weapons. The This new system, with a caliber estimated at 30 to 40
new 40-mmutipl roket aunher M-177) s mm, will probably have a greater effective range thannew 240-mm multiple rocket launcher (M-1977) is
well suited for the delivery of ICMs, and we believe its predecessor.
that it is so equipped. The Soviets probably have the 31. We also expect deployment of a successor to the
technological base to produce artillery-delivered scat- SA-6, the SA-X-11, probably within the next year. Its
VI-4
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.