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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
Top et
23. Artillery. Pact concern with increasing conven- terable mines and, while it is unlikely that such mines
tional firepower in general and with the neutralization are currently with Pact artillery units, we believe that
of NATO antitank defense in particular is expected to they will be introduced by the mid-1980s.
result in continued increases in numbers of artillery 27. Antitank Weapons. Soviet R&D programs for
pieces as well as improvements in weapons, target
acquisition capabilities, and ammunition. The upgrad-
ing of the artillery battery in the Soviet motorized rifle ment of missile systems incorporating semiautomatic
or automatic guidance to relieve the gunner of guid-
regiment to an artillery battalion-a measure already
, ance responsibility, thereby increasing hit probabilities
and reducing gunner vulnerability. These programs
bility to suppress or neutralize antitank weapons as are expected to result in the fielding of a short-to-
well as other targets. As towed artillery is replaced by medium-range man-portable system by the mid-1980s
self-propelled (SP) models (with their own armored and a similar heliborne system somewhat earlier.
command and reconnaissance vehicles) this capability These systems probably will have increased accuracy
will grow further because the newer systems have and warhead effectiveness. The heliborne system
better mobility, are more responsive, and provide and wha veess. veloy.
better crew protection. By the early 1980s, battalions
of 122-mm SP weapons probably will be found in all 28. Armored Personnel Carriers. Production of
Soviet BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments and both the BMP and the BTR-60 is expected to continue
May also appear in some BTR-equipped regiments at a steady pace. Soviet motorized rifle divisions are
and division artillery regiments. expected to standardize during the 1980s on a mix of
24. Deployment of other SP artillery weapons will one motorized rifle regiment equipped with the BMP
also proceed over the next decade. The new nuclear and two with the BTR-60PB. The motorized rifle
SP heavy artillery (203-mm guns and 240-mm mor- regiment in tank divisions will be equipped with the
tars) will continue to replace older towed weapons in BMP. The East German Army has this same organiza-
Soviet heavy artillery brigades and may supplement or tion, while the Czechoslovaks have one field army
replace lighter weapons in army artillery regiments equipped according to the Soviet pattern and another
and in artillery divisions. If the new heavy artillery in process. Poland has only about 300 BMPs and is
pieces are deployed to the Soviet groups of forces, as expected to equip no more than one additional motor-
we believe likely, it would break NATO's monopoly ized rifle regiment per year with them. The remainder
on nuclear tube artillery in Central Europe and will continue to use older models. A follow-on to the
provide the Pact with a capability to respond in kind BTR-60PB, designated the BTR-70, is in production
to NATO's use of nuclear tube artillery and to provide and is being assigned to units. These changes will
close-in nuclear strikes in support of ground forces. improve the general mobility of Pact ground forces, as
well as their capabilities for operating in a chemical,
25. NSWP artillery improvements will lag behind biological, or radiological environment.
those of the Soviets. Only a few batteries of the new SP
guns and no heavy artillery are in service in the NSWP 29. Ground Force Air Defense Systems. The
forces. The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances which they
Czechoslovak, and Polish Armies will increase, but have made in air defense weapons over the last
towed models will continue to predominate. decade. Existing systems will no doubt undergo modi-
fication and improvements. The SA-9, for example,
26. We have fair evidence that the Soviets are currently mounted on a scout car chassis, will probably
working toward development of improved conven- be deployed on a light tracked amphibious carrier that
tional munitions (ICMs) for their tube artillery sys- would increase its mobility as well as provide more
temns. The Soviets have the technology to develop internal storage space for refire missiles.
ICMs for their artillery pieces of 152-mm or larger 30. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected in the
caliber, but we have not observed them in testing. We 30. a fl- to the Zepe the
estimate, however, that by the mid-1980s the Soviets next decade, but probably not before the mid-1980s.
will field ICMs with their larger caliber weapons. The This new system, with a caliber estimated at 30 to 40
new 40-mmutipl roket aunher M-177) s mm, will probably have a greater effective range thannew 240-mm multiple rocket launcher (M-1977) is
well suited for the delivery of ICMs, and we believe its predecessor.
that it is so equipped. The Soviets probably have the 31. We also expect deployment of a successor to the
technological base to produce artillery-delivered scat- SA-6, the SA-X-11, probably within the next year. Its
VI-4
op

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.