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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top et
23. Artillery. Pact concern with increasing conven- terable mines and, while it is unlikely that such mines
tional firepower in general and with the neutralization are currently with Pact artillery units, we believe that
of NATO antitank defense in particular is expected to they will be introduced by the mid-1980s.
result in continued increases in numbers of artillery 27. Antitank Weapons. Soviet R&D programs for
pieces as well as improvements in weapons, target
acquisition capabilities, and ammunition. The upgrad-
ing of the artillery battery in the Soviet motorized rifle ment of missile systems incorporating semiautomatic
or automatic guidance to relieve the gunner of guid-
regiment to an artillery battalion-a measure already
, ance responsibility, thereby increasing hit probabilities
and reducing gunner vulnerability. These programs
bility to suppress or neutralize antitank weapons as are expected to result in the fielding of a short-to-
well as other targets. As towed artillery is replaced by medium-range man-portable system by the mid-1980s
self-propelled (SP) models (with their own armored and a similar heliborne system somewhat earlier.
command and reconnaissance vehicles) this capability These systems probably will have increased accuracy
will grow further because the newer systems have and warhead effectiveness. The heliborne system
better mobility, are more responsive, and provide and wha veess. veloy.
better crew protection. By the early 1980s, battalions
of 122-mm SP weapons probably will be found in all 28. Armored Personnel Carriers. Production of
Soviet BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments and both the BMP and the BTR-60 is expected to continue
May also appear in some BTR-equipped regiments at a steady pace. Soviet motorized rifle divisions are
and division artillery regiments. expected to standardize during the 1980s on a mix of
24. Deployment of other SP artillery weapons will one motorized rifle regiment equipped with the BMP
also proceed over the next decade. The new nuclear and two with the BTR-60PB. The motorized rifle
SP heavy artillery (203-mm guns and 240-mm mor- regiment in tank divisions will be equipped with the
tars) will continue to replace older towed weapons in BMP. The East German Army has this same organiza-
Soviet heavy artillery brigades and may supplement or tion, while the Czechoslovaks have one field army
replace lighter weapons in army artillery regiments equipped according to the Soviet pattern and another
and in artillery divisions. If the new heavy artillery in process. Poland has only about 300 BMPs and is
pieces are deployed to the Soviet groups of forces, as expected to equip no more than one additional motor-
we believe likely, it would break NATO's monopoly ized rifle regiment per year with them. The remainder
on nuclear tube artillery in Central Europe and will continue to use older models. A follow-on to the
provide the Pact with a capability to respond in kind BTR-60PB, designated the BTR-70, is in production
to NATO's use of nuclear tube artillery and to provide and is being assigned to units. These changes will
close-in nuclear strikes in support of ground forces. improve the general mobility of Pact ground forces, as
well as their capabilities for operating in a chemical,
25. NSWP artillery improvements will lag behind biological, or radiological environment.
those of the Soviets. Only a few batteries of the new SP
guns and no heavy artillery are in service in the NSWP 29. Ground Force Air Defense Systems. The
forces. The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances which they
Czechoslovak, and Polish Armies will increase, but have made in air defense weapons over the last
towed models will continue to predominate. decade. Existing systems will no doubt undergo modi-
fication and improvements. The SA-9, for example,
26. We have fair evidence that the Soviets are currently mounted on a scout car chassis, will probably
working toward development of improved conven- be deployed on a light tracked amphibious carrier that
tional munitions (ICMs) for their tube artillery sys- would increase its mobility as well as provide more
temns. The Soviets have the technology to develop internal storage space for refire missiles.
ICMs for their artillery pieces of 152-mm or larger 30. A follow-on to the ZSU-23/4 is expected in the
caliber, but we have not observed them in testing. We 30. a fl- to the Zepe the
estimate, however, that by the mid-1980s the Soviets next decade, but probably not before the mid-1980s.
will field ICMs with their larger caliber weapons. The This new system, with a caliber estimated at 30 to 40
new 40-mmutipl roket aunher M-177) s mm, will probably have a greater effective range thannew 240-mm multiple rocket launcher (M-1977) is
well suited for the delivery of ICMs, and we believe its predecessor.
that it is so equipped. The Soviets probably have the 31. We also expect deployment of a successor to the
technological base to produce artillery-delivered scat- SA-6, the SA-X-11, probably within the next year. Its
VI-4
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.