Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top -- et no doubt seek to develop some entirely new weapons have been augmented with organic infantry and artil- and support systems. Certain of these systems, such as lery battalions. The divisions' motorized rifle regi- laser- or television-guided munitions, are already in ments have been disbanded and other subordinate testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced units have been modified. The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of the tank regiments emerge in reaction to NATO weapons programs or and increase their firepower. The overall personnel force improvements. requirement for the new structure probably will not greatly exceed that of the 9,500 men in a standard 16. As the modernization of the Pact's theater Soviet tank division. forces equipment progresses, we expect continuing standardization problems. For example, the Soviets are 20. We have no evidence regarding the extent to currently producing three different medium tanks which the Soviets intend to so restructure additional while retaining older models in the inventory. This divisions. We also note that the Soviets are engaged in situation leads to other problems for Pact planners in a program to expand some standard tank divisions by that the mix and growing technical complexity of adding infantry and artillery to the tank regiments, models in the forces requires additional mechanic and but without disbanding the division's motorized rifle operator training and more elaborate logistic regiment. At best, therefore, our evidence thus far arrangements. indicates only that the Soviets are experimenting with differing ways of improving the tank-infantry-artillery Ground Forces balance in their tank divisions but have not yet settled on which alternative, or combination thereof, will be 17. Barring an agreement on mutual and balanced emphasized during the 1980s. force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition of Pact ground force divisions opposite NATO are 21. Tanks. Production of the T-72 medium tank likely to remain stable during the period of this will continue well into the 1980s, accompanied by the Estimate, although expanded divisional organizations gradual phasing out of the active Soviet inventory of and the formation of new nondivisional units probably the T-54/55 and T-62. We expect Soviet production of will account for moderate increases in manpower and the T-55 and T-64 to end within the next few years. A equipment. We foresee no development over the next new tank, designated the-T-80, is expected to -enter several years which would appreciably alter the basic service by the early 1980s, but our evidence on its 'Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive against current status is fragmentary. The NSWP armies will NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial remain largely standardized on the T-55, but some and growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact NSWP countries are expected to begin production of planners will continue to regard the tank as the the T-72 for their forces in the early 1980s. The new backbone of their ground assault forces. Considerable Romanian medium tank, an improved version of the emphasis will be placed throughout the 1980s on T-55, has been developed and could be fielded soon. modernizing the tank forces. Overall, the total number of tanks in Pact ground force units opposite NATO could increase some- 18. Improvements in other Pact forces probably what-perhaps by as much as 10 percent-as tank will also he stressed over the next decade to give their battalions in Soviet divisions in the USSR are expanded armored forces a better chance to survive on the to the tank strength which characterizes Soviet divi- modern battlefield. These almost certainly will include sions in Eastern Europe. new artillery and air defense weapons. The increased 22. There is little evidence of advanced antiarmor use of smoke and aerosols to interfere with optical and countermeasures programs in the USSR. The Soviets electro-optical surveillance and tracking devices of apparently have experimented with infrared absorb- NA 0 antitank weapons is also expected. Against ing and reflecting paints and electro optical counter- antitank helicopters the Pact probably will enlarge its ieandreflect aints and e o cou ter-mneasures. Such coatings and systems could be devel- use of tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiair- oped and applied to existing systems without a craft artillery, and other helicopters significant reequipment program. Because all present 19. We are monitoring one development in particu- and projected NATO antitank guided missiles lar with. potentially significant implications for the (ATGMs) rely on high-explosive (shaped-charge) war- Soviet ground forces during the upcoming decade. heads for their kill mechanism, the Soviets can be Over the past year the Soviets have reconfigured two expected to continue their heavy R&D emphasis on divisions, each of which has three tank regiments that developing armor to defeat these weapons. VI-3 Top
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.