Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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no doubt seek to develop some entirely new weapons have been augmented with organic infantry and artil-
and support systems. Certain of these systems, such as lery battalions. The divisions' motorized rifle regi-
laser- or television-guided munitions, are already in ments have been disbanded and other subordinate
testing. Still other Pact weapons-such as enhanced units have been modified. The changes will improve
radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of the tank regiments
emerge in reaction to NATO weapons programs or and increase their firepower. The overall personnel
force improvements. requirement for the new structure probably will not
greatly exceed that of the 9,500 men in a standard
16. As the modernization of the Pact's theater Soviet tank division.
forces equipment progresses, we expect continuing
standardization problems. For example, the Soviets are 20. We have no evidence regarding the extent to
currently producing three different medium tanks which the Soviets intend to so restructure additional
while retaining older models in the inventory. This divisions. We also note that the Soviets are engaged in
situation leads to other problems for Pact planners in a program to expand some standard tank divisions by
that the mix and growing technical complexity of adding infantry and artillery to the tank regiments,
models in the forces requires additional mechanic and but without disbanding the division's motorized rifle
operator training and more elaborate logistic regiment. At best, therefore, our evidence thus far
arrangements. indicates only that the Soviets are experimenting with
differing ways of improving the tank-infantry-artillery
Ground Forces balance in their tank divisions but have not yet settled
on which alternative, or combination thereof, will be
17. Barring an agreement on mutual and balanced emphasized during the 1980s.
force reductions (MBFR), the number and disposition
of Pact ground force divisions opposite NATO are 21. Tanks. Production of the T-72 medium tank
likely to remain stable during the period of this will continue well into the 1980s, accompanied by the
Estimate, although expanded divisional organizations gradual phasing out of the active Soviet inventory of
and the formation of new nondivisional units probably the T-54/55 and T-62. We expect Soviet production of
will account for moderate increases in manpower and the T-55 and T-64 to end within the next few years. A
equipment. We foresee no development over the next new tank, designated the-T-80, is expected to -enter
several years which would appreciably alter the basic service by the early 1980s, but our evidence on its
'Pact strategy of an armor-heavy offensive against current status is fragmentary. The NSWP armies will
NATO in Central Europe. Despite NATO's substantial remain largely standardized on the T-55, but some
and growing capability for antitank warfare, Pact NSWP countries are expected to begin production of
planners will continue to regard the tank as the the T-72 for their forces in the early 1980s. The new
backbone of their ground assault forces. Considerable Romanian medium tank, an improved version of the
emphasis will be placed throughout the 1980s on T-55, has been developed and could be fielded soon.
modernizing the tank forces. Overall, the total number of tanks in Pact ground
force units opposite NATO could increase some-
18. Improvements in other Pact forces probably what-perhaps by as much as 10 percent-as tank
will also he stressed over the next decade to give their battalions in Soviet divisions in the USSR are expanded
armored forces a better chance to survive on the to the tank strength which characterizes Soviet divi-
modern battlefield. These almost certainly will include sions in Eastern Europe.
new artillery and air defense weapons. The increased 22. There is little evidence of advanced antiarmor
use of smoke and aerosols to interfere with optical and countermeasures programs in the USSR. The Soviets
electro-optical surveillance and tracking devices of apparently have experimented with infrared absorb-
NA 0 antitank weapons is also expected. Against ing and reflecting paints and electro optical counter-
antitank helicopters the Pact probably will enlarge its ieandreflect aints and e o cou ter-mneasures. Such coatings and systems could be devel-
use of tactical surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiair- oped and applied to existing systems without a
craft artillery, and other helicopters significant reequipment program. Because all present
19. We are monitoring one development in particu- and projected NATO antitank guided missiles
lar with. potentially significant implications for the (ATGMs) rely on high-explosive (shaped-charge) war-
Soviet ground forces during the upcoming decade. heads for their kill mechanism, the Soviets can be
Over the past year the Soviets have reconfigured two expected to continue their heavy R&D emphasis on
divisions, each of which has three tank regiments that developing armor to defeat these weapons.
VI-3
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