Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
lot that suggests the Soviets anticipate cutbacks in allocat- redress major deficiencies, but no one development or ing resources to theater forces. Indeed, we have good even a combination of technological developments in evidence that some NSWP countries plan modest the foreseeable future is expected to revolutionize increases. modern warfare or provide a decided advantage to Pact forces. Demographic Factors 8. In every Warsaw Pact country the military Sino-Soviet Relations manpower procurement system depends on conscrip- 12. The size of the Soviet forces opposite China- tion. Conscripts provide up to 75 percent of the nearly 25 percent of the total theater forces-suggests manpower assigned to the regular armed forces, the a potential for some impact on the forces facing border guards, and some elements of the internal NATO. There is no evidence, however, that the security forces. During the next decade, however, the burden of maintaining forces against China has seri- number of young men reaching draft age each year ously constrained Soviet military posture in the West will decline in most Pact countries, a trend that will in recent years, and we do not anticipate such an complicate the allocation of manpower between the effect in the foreseeable future. Short of a rapproche- armed forces and industry. ment with China, which could release some resources for defense in the West, or a war with China, which 9. Pact military manpower requirements are ex- wvould, at a minimum, absorb much of the Soviet troop pected to increase only modestly in the next 10 years. and ltia reserves in theester tral Even so, there may be shortfalls in available military and logistical reserves in the western and central manpwer ThPac contres culdmee suc shrt- USSR, we believe the Soviets can continue to support falls by changes in their manpower procurement both efforts at present or even modestly greater levels. systems. They could grant fewer deferments, extend the term of conscript service, increase the use of B. Trends in the Size and Composition of Future women in the armed forces, and supplement the Forces number of full-time soldiers by recalling reservists to 13. In this section we estimate likely changes in the active duty for short periods. They might also attempt size and composition of the Warsaw Pact's theater to persuade more conscripts to extend their service.' forces during the next five to 10 years. These estimates 10. We do not believe that the manpower squeeze are based on our knowledge of ongoing Soviet weapons will lead to any decline in future Pact military production and deployment programs and new weap- manpower. We expect that most Pact countries, the ons which we have identified in research and develop- USSR included, will meet their projected military ment or testing. We have also considered evidence manpower needs by some combination of the options relating to gaps which the Soviets perceive in Pact mentioned above. Some are already calling previously weapons capabilities and Pact production and techno- exempted reservists to active duty for up to six logical capabilities. months. Fewer deferments are being granted, and the General grounds for medical exemption have been defined more clearly and strictly. In a few Pact countries, 14. Although the expansion in manpower which those persons found unfit for combat duties are being characterized Pact theater forces during the mid- placed in sedentary military positions rather than 1960s and early 1970s has slowed, we expect some being exempted. . gradual increase in manpower in Pact ground and air combat units opposite NATO over the next decade as Technology ongoing programs are implemented. The overall num- ber of ground and air combat units opposite NATO is 11. We foresee no technological breakthrough that expected to remain at or near its current level, while a could lead to a major change in either the size or modest decline is anticipated in the number of general character of the Pact theater forces during the period purpose naval ships and submarines. of this Estimate. New technology, whether developed, purchased, or illegally acquired, is expected to lead to 15. Warsaw Pact nations will continue to improve improvements in individual Pact systems and help the weapons and equipment in their theater forces opposite NATO. Major weapon production and de- See paragraphs 44 and 45 in chapter it for differing agency ployment programs which are clearly in midstream views on Pact extended-service programs. are expected to continue. In addition, the Soviets will Vi-2
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.