Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top t7 _71e CHAPTER VI FUTURE FORCES 1. As we have noted in chapter II, the past decade ing. We believe that they will see current develop- was marked by vigorous modernization of Soviet ments in NATO as portending a continuing strong theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was NATO defense posture with good prospects for im- accompanied by some increase in the manpower provement, especially in the critical Central European strength of the forces-especially in the late 1960s and area. They are likely to be especially concerned with early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was expected improvements in NATO's precision weapons increased and as support requirements grew to accom- and nuclear systems. Nothing in NATO's current or modate more, increasingly sophisticated hardware, near-term defense programs, however, is likely to Modernization of the Soviet theater forces is evidently precipitate any major change in the level of Pact continuing at much the same pace, along with modest, efforts. Over the longer term, the large-scale deploy- commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet ment by NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet system, such as ground-launched cruise missiles, could buildup, although at a slower pace and with uneven cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air results, especially in the more expensive tactical air defense. and missile forces and in ground force armor replace- ment programs. Soviet Leadership 5. Change in Soviet leadership within the period of A. Factors Affecting Future Forces this Estimate is inevitable. At least in its early phase, 2. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed however, the change is unlikely to alter the priority analysis of the factors that motivate the Soviets' mili- given to theater forces. The new leaders, whoever they tary policy toward Europe and the development of may be, will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of their theater forces. These factors are discussed in the present leadership which are responsible for creat- detail in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations ing current Pact forces and which are committed to in the Global Power Arena. We proceed from the maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The premise that the developments we currently observe in new leaders will likely seek to -avoid moves that would Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent antagonize large segments of the military. the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradu- Economic Considerations ally improve the capabilities of these large standing forces. They are the activities necessary to replace 6. Since 1970, total Soviet defense spending, which obsolete or wornout equipment and to incorporate accounts for 11 to 12 percent of the USSR's gross new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous national product, has grown at an average annual rate Soviet research and development program. They por- of 4 to 5 percent. Spending for Soviet theater forces tend no large, short-term change in the general size or opposite NATO has grown at roughly the same rate character of these forces. and probably will continue to grow into the 1980s. This judgment is supported by several trends in Soviet 3. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, defense programs, the increasing costs of new, more we have examined a number of factors which conceiv- complex military hardware, the large number of ably could alter it. This examination is summarized in weapons development programs currently under way, the following paragraphs, and the continuing capital investment in defense industries. Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities 7. We have taken note of the decline in Soviet 4. The Soviets have a keen perception of NATO's economic performance and the economic difficulties forces and military programs and regard NATO's of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova- capabilities as substantial and technologically challeng- kia. Despite these difficulties, we find no evidence VI-1 Tp t
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.