“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Top t7 _71e
CHAPTER VI
FUTURE FORCES
1. As we have noted in chapter II, the past decade ing. We believe that they will see current develop-
was marked by vigorous modernization of Soviet ments in NATO as portending a continuing strong
theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was NATO defense posture with good prospects for im-
accompanied by some increase in the manpower provement, especially in the critical Central European
strength of the forces-especially in the late 1960s and area. They are likely to be especially concerned with
early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was expected improvements in NATO's precision weapons
increased and as support requirements grew to accom- and nuclear systems. Nothing in NATO's current or
modate more, increasingly sophisticated hardware, near-term defense programs, however, is likely to
Modernization of the Soviet theater forces is evidently precipitate any major change in the level of Pact
continuing at much the same pace, along with modest, efforts. Over the longer term, the large-scale deploy-
commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet ment by NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet system, such as ground-launched cruise missiles, could
buildup, although at a slower pace and with uneven cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air
results, especially in the more expensive tactical air defense.
and missile forces and in ground force armor replace-
ment programs. Soviet Leadership
5. Change in Soviet leadership within the period of
A. Factors Affecting Future Forces this Estimate is inevitable. At least in its early phase,
2. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed however, the change is unlikely to alter the priority
analysis of the factors that motivate the Soviets' mili- given to theater forces. The new leaders, whoever they
tary policy toward Europe and the development of may be, will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of
their theater forces. These factors are discussed in the present leadership which are responsible for creat-
detail in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations ing current Pact forces and which are committed to
in the Global Power Arena. We proceed from the maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The
premise that the developments we currently observe in new leaders will likely seek to -avoid moves that would
Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent antagonize large segments of the military.
the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradu- Economic Considerations
ally improve the capabilities of these large standing
forces. They are the activities necessary to replace 6. Since 1970, total Soviet defense spending, which
obsolete or wornout equipment and to incorporate accounts for 11 to 12 percent of the USSR's gross
new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous national product, has grown at an average annual rate
Soviet research and development program. They por- of 4 to 5 percent. Spending for Soviet theater forces
tend no large, short-term change in the general size or opposite NATO has grown at roughly the same rate
character of these forces. and probably will continue to grow into the 1980s.
This judgment is supported by several trends in Soviet
3. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, defense programs, the increasing costs of new, more
we have examined a number of factors which conceiv- complex military hardware, the large number of
ably could alter it. This examination is summarized in weapons development programs currently under way,
the following paragraphs, and the continuing capital investment in defense
industries.
Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities
7. We have taken note of the decline in Soviet
4. The Soviets have a keen perception of NATO's economic performance and the economic difficulties
forces and military programs and regard NATO's of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova-
capabilities as substantial and technologically challeng- kia. Despite these difficulties, we find no evidence
VI-1
Tp t