Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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CHAPTER VI
FUTURE FORCES
1. As we have noted in chapter II, the past decade ing. We believe that they will see current develop-
was marked by vigorous modernization of Soviet ments in NATO as portending a continuing strong
theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was NATO defense posture with good prospects for im-
accompanied by some increase in the manpower provement, especially in the critical Central European
strength of the forces-especially in the late 1960s and area. They are likely to be especially concerned with
early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was expected improvements in NATO's precision weapons
increased and as support requirements grew to accom- and nuclear systems. Nothing in NATO's current or
modate more, increasingly sophisticated hardware, near-term defense programs, however, is likely to
Modernization of the Soviet theater forces is evidently precipitate any major change in the level of Pact
continuing at much the same pace, along with modest, efforts. Over the longer term, the large-scale deploy-
commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet ment by NATO of a new theater nuclear delivery
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet system, such as ground-launched cruise missiles, could
buildup, although at a slower pace and with uneven cause an upswing in Pact efforts, especially in air
results, especially in the more expensive tactical air defense.
and missile forces and in ground force armor replace-
ment programs. Soviet Leadership
5. Change in Soviet leadership within the period of
A. Factors Affecting Future Forces this Estimate is inevitable. At least in its early phase,
2. In this Estimate we do not provide a detailed however, the change is unlikely to alter the priority
analysis of the factors that motivate the Soviets' mili- given to theater forces. The new leaders, whoever they
tary policy toward Europe and the development of may be, will undoubtedly emerge from the ranks of
their theater forces. These factors are discussed in the present leadership which are responsible for creat-
detail in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations ing current Pact forces and which are committed to
in the Global Power Arena. We proceed from the maintaining Soviet military strength in Europe. The
premise that the developments we currently observe in new leaders will likely seek to -avoid moves that would
Warsaw Pact theater forces opposite NATO represent antagonize large segments of the military.
the sorts of activities necessary to maintain and gradu- Economic Considerations
ally improve the capabilities of these large standing
forces. They are the activities necessary to replace 6. Since 1970, total Soviet defense spending, which
obsolete or wornout equipment and to incorporate accounts for 11 to 12 percent of the USSR's gross
new weapons and tactics which flow from a vigorous national product, has grown at an average annual rate
Soviet research and development program. They por- of 4 to 5 percent. Spending for Soviet theater forces
tend no large, short-term change in the general size or opposite NATO has grown at roughly the same rate
character of these forces. and probably will continue to grow into the 1980s.
This judgment is supported by several trends in Soviet
3. Although we believe this to be a valid premise, defense programs, the increasing costs of new, more
we have examined a number of factors which conceiv- complex military hardware, the large number of
ably could alter it. This examination is summarized in weapons development programs currently under way,
the following paragraphs, and the continuing capital investment in defense
industries.
Soviet Perceptions of NATO's Military Capabilities
7. We have taken note of the decline in Soviet
4. The Soviets have a keen perception of NATO's economic performance and the economic difficulties
forces and military programs and regard NATO's of such NSWP countries as Poland and Czechoslova-
capabilities as substantial and technologically challeng- kia. Despite these difficulties, we find no evidence
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