Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Top e-t - Preemption continues to be a feature of Soviet nuclear doctrine. (1, 1.5) - Improvements in the USSR's forward-based nuclear forces would permit the Soviets to fight a tactical nuclear war at relatively high levels of intensity without having to use USSR-based systems. Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued modernization of USSR-based peripheral strike systems rgue that they still expect to have to resort to the use of these weapons at some stage of theater nuclear war. (I, 16) 4. The Soviets are clearly planning against the contingency that chemical weapons might be used in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing, vigorous program to equip and train Pact forces for operations in a toxic environment and have produced a variety of chemical agents and delivery systems. We are divided, however, on the question of Soviet policy for the first use of chemical weapons. Some believe 2 that it is unlikely that the Warsaw Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances cannot be entirely excluded. Others believe ' there is a strong possibility that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional conflict. Chapter I contains the rationale underlying these views. (I, 18-29) Trends in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces 5. The past decade was marked by vigorous modernization of Soviet theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was accompa- nied by some increase in the manpower of the forces-especially in the late 196.Os and early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was increased and as support requirements grew to accommodate more, increasingly sophisticated hardware. Modernization of the Soviet theater forces is evidently continuing at much the same pace, along with modest, commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet buildup, although at a slower pace and with uneven results, especially in the more expensive tactical air and missile forces and in ground force armor replacement programs. (VI, 1) 6. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear phase of hostilities and their recognition of a need for strong conventional forces even in the event of nuclear war, the Soviets have especially sought to improve The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency.and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and lesearch, Department of State. The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. 7 Tp et
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.