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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top e-t
- Preemption continues to be a feature of Soviet nuclear doctrine.
(1, 1.5)
- Improvements in the USSR's forward-based nuclear forces would
permit the Soviets to fight a tactical nuclear war at relatively
high levels of intensity without having to use USSR-based
systems. Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued modernization of
USSR-based peripheral strike systems
rgue that they still
expect to have to resort to the use of these weapons at some stage
of theater nuclear war. (I, 16)
4. The Soviets are clearly planning against the contingency that
chemical weapons might be used in a war between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. They have a continuing, vigorous program to equip and
train Pact forces for operations in a toxic environment and have
produced a variety of chemical agents and delivery systems. We are
divided, however, on the question of Soviet policy for the first use of
chemical weapons. Some believe 2 that it is unlikely that the Warsaw
Pact would initiate offensive chemical warfare before the advent of
nuclear war, but that the Pact's first use under these circumstances
cannot be entirely excluded. Others believe ' there is a strong possibility
that the Soviets would initiate chemical warfare in a conventional
conflict. Chapter I contains the rationale underlying these views. (I,
18-29)
Trends in Warsaw Pact Theater Forces
5. The past decade was marked by vigorous modernization of
Soviet theater forces facing NATO. This modernization was accompa-
nied by some increase in the manpower of the forces-especially in the
late 196.Os and early 1970s-as the number of weapons in units was
increased and as support requirements grew to accommodate more,
increasingly sophisticated hardware. Modernization of the Soviet
theater forces is evidently continuing at much the same pace, along with
modest, commensurate growth in manpower. The non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact (NSWP) forces have shared in the Soviet buildup, although at a
slower pace and with uneven results, especially in the more expensive
tactical air and missile forces and in ground force armor replacement
programs. (VI, 1)
6. Motivated by the prospect of a nonnuclear phase of hostilities
and their recognition of a need for strong conventional forces even in
the event of nuclear war, the Soviets have especially sought to improve
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency.and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and lesearch, Department of State.
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director, National
Security Agency; and the Senior Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
7
Tp et

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.