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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
would be to destroy NATO's means for waging nu- 17. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces would have
clear war. Accordingly, a typical target list for the a key role during large-scale nuclear operations. Al-
Soviet strategic forces would include NATO nuclear though the SRF's medium- and intermediate-range
missile sites; airfields used by nuclear delivery aircraft; ballistic missiles would be assigned a variety of strate-
nuclear weapons storage sites; and command, 'control, gic targets, some sources have indicated they would be
and communications facilities. Other airfields, air primarily used to destroy NATO airfields, air de-
defense facilities, large troop concentrations, and con- fenses, and command and control facilities beyond the
ventional storage depots probably are also targeted, as reach of the Pact's forward-based tactical systems. In
well as some political and economic centers. In all addition to the MRBMs and IRBMs, some of the Soviet
instances, strikes by the strategic forces would be ICBMs might be used against NATO targets in Eu-
coordinated with those by the Pact's tactical nuclear rope. Ballistic missiles launched from the G- and H-
forces. . class submarines are not as accurate as most of the
16. In Europe there are several thousand military, nd-based missiles and probably would be used
political, and economic targets in these categories agamst large targets such as ports.
which the Soviets might wish to cover. Military targets 18. The Long Range Aviation bomber force would
range from those that have been extensively hardened also be used both during the initial nuclear strike and
to those that are highly vulnerable. We estimate that for followup strikes against targets not already de-
there are fewer than 300 hardened targets of signifi- stroyed or attacked. As much as one-third of the LRA
cant military value in the European NATO countries. bomber force would be withheld from use in conven-
About half of these are slightly hardened installa- tional operations in anticipation of escalation to nucle-
tions-such as nuclear weapons storage facilities, some ar conflict. All LRA bombers based in the western
POL storage facilities, and ground force depots. The USSR could reach most potential NATO targets direct-
remainder are moderately hard installations such as ly from their home airfields carrying either bombs or
command posts and the French intermediate-range air-to-surface missiles. For most of these targets, the
missile silos. The great majority of potential targets in unrefueled combat radius of the LRA bombers is
Europe are soft area targets, including NATO air- sufficient to permit the use of indirect routing and
fields, ports, and air defense facilities, low-level flight profiles to evade NATO air defenses.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.