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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
would be to destroy NATO's means for waging nu- 17. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces would have
clear war. Accordingly, a typical target list for the a key role during large-scale nuclear operations. Al-
Soviet strategic forces would include NATO nuclear though the SRF's medium- and intermediate-range
missile sites; airfields used by nuclear delivery aircraft; ballistic missiles would be assigned a variety of strate-
nuclear weapons storage sites; and command, 'control, gic targets, some sources have indicated they would be
and communications facilities. Other airfields, air primarily used to destroy NATO airfields, air de-
defense facilities, large troop concentrations, and con- fenses, and command and control facilities beyond the
ventional storage depots probably are also targeted, as reach of the Pact's forward-based tactical systems. In
well as some political and economic centers. In all addition to the MRBMs and IRBMs, some of the Soviet
instances, strikes by the strategic forces would be ICBMs might be used against NATO targets in Eu-
coordinated with those by the Pact's tactical nuclear rope. Ballistic missiles launched from the G- and H-
forces. . class submarines are not as accurate as most of the
16. In Europe there are several thousand military, nd-based missiles and probably would be used
political, and economic targets in these categories agamst large targets such as ports.
which the Soviets might wish to cover. Military targets 18. The Long Range Aviation bomber force would
range from those that have been extensively hardened also be used both during the initial nuclear strike and
to those that are highly vulnerable. We estimate that for followup strikes against targets not already de-
there are fewer than 300 hardened targets of signifi- stroyed or attacked. As much as one-third of the LRA
cant military value in the European NATO countries. bomber force would be withheld from use in conven-
About half of these are slightly hardened installa- tional operations in anticipation of escalation to nucle-
tions-such as nuclear weapons storage facilities, some ar conflict. All LRA bombers based in the western
POL storage facilities, and ground force depots. The USSR could reach most potential NATO targets direct-
remainder are moderately hard installations such as ly from their home airfields carrying either bombs or
command posts and the French intermediate-range air-to-surface missiles. For most of these targets, the
missile silos. The great majority of potential targets in unrefueled combat radius of the LRA bombers is
Europe are soft area targets, including NATO air- sufficient to permit the use of indirect routing and
fields, ports, and air defense facilities, low-level flight profiles to evade NATO air defenses.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.