Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
would be to destroy NATO's means for waging nu- 17. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces would have clear war. Accordingly, a typical target list for the a key role during large-scale nuclear operations. Al- Soviet strategic forces would include NATO nuclear though the SRF's medium- and intermediate-range missile sites; airfields used by nuclear delivery aircraft; ballistic missiles would be assigned a variety of strate- nuclear weapons storage sites; and command, 'control, gic targets, some sources have indicated they would be and communications facilities. Other airfields, air primarily used to destroy NATO airfields, air de- defense facilities, large troop concentrations, and con- fenses, and command and control facilities beyond the ventional storage depots probably are also targeted, as reach of the Pact's forward-based tactical systems. In well as some political and economic centers. In all addition to the MRBMs and IRBMs, some of the Soviet instances, strikes by the strategic forces would be ICBMs might be used against NATO targets in Eu- coordinated with those by the Pact's tactical nuclear rope. Ballistic missiles launched from the G- and H- forces. . class submarines are not as accurate as most of the 16. In Europe there are several thousand military, nd-based missiles and probably would be used political, and economic targets in these categories agamst large targets such as ports. which the Soviets might wish to cover. Military targets 18. The Long Range Aviation bomber force would range from those that have been extensively hardened also be used both during the initial nuclear strike and to those that are highly vulnerable. We estimate that for followup strikes against targets not already de- there are fewer than 300 hardened targets of signifi- stroyed or attacked. As much as one-third of the LRA cant military value in the European NATO countries. bomber force would be withheld from use in conven- About half of these are slightly hardened installa- tional operations in anticipation of escalation to nucle- tions-such as nuclear weapons storage facilities, some ar conflict. All LRA bombers based in the western POL storage facilities, and ground force depots. The USSR could reach most potential NATO targets direct- remainder are moderately hard installations such as ly from their home airfields carrying either bombs or command posts and the French intermediate-range air-to-surface missiles. For most of these targets, the missile silos. The great majority of potential targets in unrefueled combat radius of the LRA bombers is Europe are soft area targets, including NATO air- sufficient to permit the use of indirect routing and fields, ports, and air defense facilities, low-level flight profiles to evade NATO air defenses. V-3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.