Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
tions, they might launch a nuclear attack at sea in the expectation that it could be confined to the sea campaign and would not precipitate the employment of tactical nuclear weapons inthe mund-camnaign 9. During a coordinated, large-scale initial strike, many tactical missiles probably would be targeted against air defense systems. Tactical missile strikes could precede strikes by tactical aircraft by 15 to 20 minutes. the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably because tactical aircraft are more versatile and better able to locate mobile targets than missiles and because the Pact currently does not have nuclear artillery in Eastern Europe. The mix of low- and high-yield bombs allo- cated to Soviet Frontal Aviation I___ is about equal, while heavier warheads predominate in the mix of such weapons allocated to tactical missile units. Following the initial strikes, when the effective- ness of the air defense systems presumably would be reduced, the Soviets clearly place increasing reliance on air-delivered weapons. the USSR would be unlikely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons at sea while a war was being fought with only conventional weapons against NATO in Europe. the clear predilecion o. Soviet military policymakers to focus Nuclear Strikes Against NATO by Soviet decisions on the developing situation in Central Strategic Forces Europe and to avoid actions elsewhere that would 14. Our understanding of Soviet concepts for the jeopardize the campaign there or that would cause an employment of strategic forces against European escalation to nuclear warfare. Nevertheless, Soviet NATO is hampered by a lack of precise information general purpose naval forces are normally armed with regarding: what the Soviets see as the specific num- nuclear weapons during peacetime deployments and bers, locations, and vulnerabilities of potential targets; would be prepared at the outset of hostilities to how the Soviets allocate strategic weapons among conduct nuclear operations if a decision were made to NATO military, political, and economic targets; anddo so. Once authorized, these operations would be -how the Soviets view the capabilities and limitations of directed mainly against important NATO surface their own weapon systems and forces. Despite these ships, submarines, and possibly selected land targets. uncertainties, technical analysis of Soviet strategic 11. An alternate view * maintains that Soviet ni- systems, evidence from Pact exercises and military clear operations at sea would not necessarily await writings, and our knowledge of Western targets permit employment of nuclear weapons on land. Should the some conjecture as to how Soviet strategic strike forces Soviets perceive a major threat to their security inter- might be used against NATO. ests or military objectives from NATO carrier forma- 15. We believe that Soviet doctrine emphasizes * The holder of this view is the Director of Naval Intelligence, counterforce rather than countervalue strikes. The Department of the Navy. prime objective of Soviet nuclear forces in wartime V-2 Toecret-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.