Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Top et
best attack submarines to provide escort for Y-class aircraft probably would be part of each attack forma-
SSBNs. Because Western SSNs can launch torpedoes tion. The Backfire would be better able to survive
outside the detection envelope of V- and Y-class because of its high-speed capability-near Mach 2 at
submarines, the Soviets probably could not prevent at high altitude-and modern ECM equipment, although
least some of their SSBNs from being destroyed. both Badger and Backfire aircraft have large radar
cross sections which would make them easily detect-
193. For anticarrier warfare, the Soviets' reliance able. Cruise missiles, flying at speeds of Mach 2.5 to
on external targeting support could effectively restrict 3.5 and launched by aircraft which successfully pene-
the operating areas of their long-range cruise missile trated the interceptor zone, would face shipborne
submarines, such as the E-I and the J-class, to areas surface-to-air missile, gun, and ECM systems.
within range of the Bear D aircraft. In addition, these
submarines must surface to launch their missiles and 196. Surface Forces. The effectiveness of Soviet
hence would be vulnerable. The more modern C-class surface combatants in the Norwegian Sea would be a
would pose a more serious threat in distant waters, but function not only of their capabilities as individual
these submarines probably would not be able to keep ships, but also of their cooperation with each other and
up with fast-moving carrier strike forces. Moreover, with submarines and aircraft. As individual units,
Soviet cruise-missile-armed submarines normally carry Soviet surface ships are particularly weak in providing
a mixed load of nuclear and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the number available for and protection against low-flying aircraft and cruise
conventional strikes. missiles. Their ASW capability suffers particularly
from a limited sensor range. The ranges at which they
194. Aircraft. The success of antiship attacks by can reliably detect attacking submarines are less than
naval or LRA aircraft would hinge primarily on the the range at which the submarine can detect and
capabilities of the aircraft and their cruise missiles to attack the surface ship. ASW sensor range is also less
penetrate a series of NATO land-based and fleet air than that of such primary ASW weapons as the SS-N-
defenses. These defenses include land- and ship-based 14, making it extremely difficult for an individual
aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and electronic Soviet ship without ASW helicopters to exploit the
countermeasures systems to confuse, decoy, or disrupt potential of such weapons fully;
the sensors of incoming aircraft or cruise missiles. At
medium and high altitudes, NATO radars and land- 197. The weaknesses of individual ships are over-
based interceptors or surface-to-air missile systems can come to some extent when ships, submarines, and
cover virtually all approaches to the Norwegian and aircraft operate in concert, as they presumably would
North Seas and the G-I-UK gap, except for flights in the Norwegian Sea, supporting and complementing
around northern Norway to the important northern one another with sensor and weapons coverage. The
and central Norwegian Sea areas. If Soviet strike presence of a Kiev, with its multiple sensors, weapon
aircraft successfully penetrated or avoided NATO systems, and command and control capabilities, would
land-based air defenses, they then would have to deal provide a significant addition to the capability of the
with formidable fleet air defenses. other surface forces. For example, operations by the
Kiev's V/STOL aircraft would be valuable in thwart-
195. The first line of fleet air defense typically ing fair-weather attacks from slower NATO aircraft
would be an outer zone defended by carrier-based such as the P-3 and in limiting the operations of
early warning aircraft and interceptors. It could ex- AWACS (airborne warning and control systems)
tend more than 400 nm from the fleet, well beyond aircraft.
the 200-nm maximum missile launch range of the best 198. According to an alternative view, paragraphs
Soviet air-to-surface missiles. A Soviet airstrike against 191-197 should convey a more balanced appraisal of
a NATO task group including two US aircraft carriers, potential effectiveness, in substance as well as in
for example, might have to confront more than 30 tone.n' The holders of this view believe these nara-
carrier-based interceptors. Soviet strike aircraft, espe- tone.s te holderstis eweiev thee i ara-
cially the TU-16s, would be highly vulnerable to graphs tend to overstress weaknesses inherent in Soviet
attacks by interceptors as they maneuvered to launch platforms, such as the relative noisiness of submarines,
ttck ASs.intercethorsg theydii u U tolunhb without offsetting consideration of inherent strengths,their ASMs. Although individual TU-16s would be ____
vulnerable because of their slow speed and lack of 9 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
extensive ECM (electronic countermeasures) equip- Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the
ment for self-defense, one or more Badger ECM Navy.
IV-41
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