Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top et
best attack submarines to provide escort for Y-class aircraft probably would be part of each attack forma-
SSBNs. Because Western SSNs can launch torpedoes tion. The Backfire would be better able to survive
outside the detection envelope of V- and Y-class because of its high-speed capability-near Mach 2 at
submarines, the Soviets probably could not prevent at high altitude-and modern ECM equipment, although
least some of their SSBNs from being destroyed. both Badger and Backfire aircraft have large radar
cross sections which would make them easily detect-
193. For anticarrier warfare, the Soviets' reliance able. Cruise missiles, flying at speeds of Mach 2.5 to
on external targeting support could effectively restrict 3.5 and launched by aircraft which successfully pene-
the operating areas of their long-range cruise missile trated the interceptor zone, would face shipborne
submarines, such as the E-I and the J-class, to areas surface-to-air missile, gun, and ECM systems.
within range of the Bear D aircraft. In addition, these
submarines must surface to launch their missiles and 196. Surface Forces. The effectiveness of Soviet
hence would be vulnerable. The more modern C-class surface combatants in the Norwegian Sea would be a
would pose a more serious threat in distant waters, but function not only of their capabilities as individual
these submarines probably would not be able to keep ships, but also of their cooperation with each other and
up with fast-moving carrier strike forces. Moreover, with submarines and aircraft. As individual units,
Soviet cruise-missile-armed submarines normally carry Soviet surface ships are particularly weak in providing
a mixed load of nuclear and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft
missiles, thereby reducing the number available for and protection against low-flying aircraft and cruise
conventional strikes. missiles. Their ASW capability suffers particularly
from a limited sensor range. The ranges at which they
194. Aircraft. The success of antiship attacks by can reliably detect attacking submarines are less than
naval or LRA aircraft would hinge primarily on the the range at which the submarine can detect and
capabilities of the aircraft and their cruise missiles to attack the surface ship. ASW sensor range is also less
penetrate a series of NATO land-based and fleet air than that of such primary ASW weapons as the SS-N-
defenses. These defenses include land- and ship-based 14, making it extremely difficult for an individual
aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and electronic Soviet ship without ASW helicopters to exploit the
countermeasures systems to confuse, decoy, or disrupt potential of such weapons fully;
the sensors of incoming aircraft or cruise missiles. At
medium and high altitudes, NATO radars and land- 197. The weaknesses of individual ships are over-
based interceptors or surface-to-air missile systems can come to some extent when ships, submarines, and
cover virtually all approaches to the Norwegian and aircraft operate in concert, as they presumably would
North Seas and the G-I-UK gap, except for flights in the Norwegian Sea, supporting and complementing
around northern Norway to the important northern one another with sensor and weapons coverage. The
and central Norwegian Sea areas. If Soviet strike presence of a Kiev, with its multiple sensors, weapon
aircraft successfully penetrated or avoided NATO systems, and command and control capabilities, would
land-based air defenses, they then would have to deal provide a significant addition to the capability of the
with formidable fleet air defenses. other surface forces. For example, operations by the
Kiev's V/STOL aircraft would be valuable in thwart-
195. The first line of fleet air defense typically ing fair-weather attacks from slower NATO aircraft
would be an outer zone defended by carrier-based such as the P-3 and in limiting the operations of
early warning aircraft and interceptors. It could ex- AWACS (airborne warning and control systems)
tend more than 400 nm from the fleet, well beyond aircraft.
the 200-nm maximum missile launch range of the best 198. According to an alternative view, paragraphs
Soviet air-to-surface missiles. A Soviet airstrike against 191-197 should convey a more balanced appraisal of
a NATO task group including two US aircraft carriers, potential effectiveness, in substance as well as in
for example, might have to confront more than 30 tone.n' The holders of this view believe these nara-
carrier-based interceptors. Soviet strike aircraft, espe- tone.s te holderstis eweiev thee i ara-
cially the TU-16s, would be highly vulnerable to graphs tend to overstress weaknesses inherent in Soviet
attacks by interceptors as they maneuvered to launch platforms, such as the relative noisiness of submarines,
ttck ASs.intercethorsg theydii u U tolunhb without offsetting consideration of inherent strengths,their ASMs. Although individual TU-16s would be ____
vulnerable because of their slow speed and lack of 9 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
extensive ECM (electronic countermeasures) equip- Agency, and the Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the
ment for self-defense, one or more Badger ECM Navy.
IV-41
i lop e

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.