Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
deployment to the Northern Fleet. On the other hand, groups to the Norwegian Sea and not to the North Sea, if the Soviets perceived a reduced threat in the they almost certainly would reinforce their forces Pacific-for example, if the United States moved there with one or more regiments of naval strike several aircraft carriers from the Pacific to the Atlan- aircraft from the other fleets, plus some LRA bombers tic-they probably would send one or two regiments if they could be spared from operations in Central of Pacific Fleet strike aircraft to the western USSR. Europe. The Soviets maintain four strike regiments in the Pacific Fleet, with some 95 ASM-carrying aircraft. 190. Operations in the Barents Sea. If Soviet defenses in the Norwegian Sea were penetrated by 187. About 17 TU-142 Bear F and 18 IL-38 May NATO naval forces, large Soviet forces would be fixed-wing ASW aircraft are also part of the Noithern available to confront them in the Barents Sea. In Fleet, and about 15 of each probably would be addition to available naval strike aircraft, these forces available for patrols throughout the Norwegian Sea. could include 10 submarines (nearly 15 percent of The TU-142s probably would conduct missions in those available). These would be mostly medium- southern portions of the Norwegian Sea to take advan- range torpedo attack units, possibly supplemented by tage of their greater endurance, while the IL-38s one or two J-class cruise missile submarines. In addi- would patrol farther north. If the TU-1i42s in this force tion, about 17 destroyers and frigates, plus about 20 spent about five hours on station and suffered no missile patrol boats, about 19 short-range ASW fixed- combat attrition, the force could mount about nine wing aircraft, and about 40 ASW helicopters probably missions per day for the first three days of combat, would be available for operations in the approaches to and about seven missions per day thereafter. Under the Barents. Some tactical aircraft supporting land the same conditions in the central area the IL-38 force operations in the area might also be made available for could average about 10 missions per day for the first antiship attacks. The seaward approaches to the Mur- three days and about eight missions per day thereafter. mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's coastal missile and artil- 188. The Soviets would also have 21 TU-95 long- lery force. range and 17 TU-16 medium-range reconnaissance aircraft available for comprehensive surveillance of Potential Effectiveness " the Norwegian Sea. Four of the TU-95s could be deployed to Cuba and Angola, although they would be 191. Submarines. In conducting these operations, extremely vulnerable if they attempted to operate Soviet submarines would be present in large numbers, from these countries in wartime. Some TU-95 sorties but they would be limited by their poor detection to the North Atlantic through the G-I-UK gap prob- capability against Western ballistic missile and attack ably would be attempted to verify intelligence infor- submarines. This makes it unlikely that Soviet subma- mation on important targets, such as aircraft carriers rines would be able to solve the initial ASW problem heading toward the Norwegian Sea or North Sea. If of target location and would make it difficult to TU-95s flew to their maximum endurance of about 19 protect themselves from NATO submarines. hours, the TU-95 force could average some six missions 192. The Soviets consider that a key but difficult per day for the first three days of combat, and five task for their attack submarines during the conven- missions per day thereafter. If the TU-16s flew to their tional phase of a war would be the protection of Soviet maximum endurance of about seven hours, the force SSBNs from NATO ASW forces, particularly nuclear could average some 15 missions per day for the first attack submarines (SSNs). The Y-class, for example, three days, and 12 missions per day thereafter. not only is much noisier than Western nuclear subma- 189. Several NATO aircraft carrier task groups rines, but also, in order for its SS-N-6 missiles to reach 189.SevralNATOairraf cariertas grups targets in the United States, must operate in areas entering the Norwegian Sea at the same time would complicate the situation for Soviet anticarrier forces where it is subject to detection by the US sound because they would divide Soviet firepower. The surveillance system (SOSUS) and where it would have Soviets probably hope that hostile carrier task groups little or no support from other Soviet forces. The would be weakened sufficiently by initial submarine Soviets therefore probably would assign a few of their attacks in the G-I-UK area so that their destruction cu ee paragraphs 198-200, setting forth an alternative view ofcould be completed in the central Nowegian Sea withm the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the forces available. If the Soviets were certain that Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, regarding paragraphs NATO was about to send more than two carrier task 191-197. IV-40
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.