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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
deployment to the Northern Fleet. On the other hand, groups to the Norwegian Sea and not to the North Sea,
if the Soviets perceived a reduced threat in the they almost certainly would reinforce their forces
Pacific-for example, if the United States moved there with one or more regiments of naval strike
several aircraft carriers from the Pacific to the Atlan- aircraft from the other fleets, plus some LRA bombers
tic-they probably would send one or two regiments if they could be spared from operations in Central
of Pacific Fleet strike aircraft to the western USSR. Europe.
The Soviets maintain four strike regiments in the
Pacific Fleet, with some 95 ASM-carrying aircraft. 190. Operations in the Barents Sea. If Soviet
defenses in the Norwegian Sea were penetrated by
187. About 17 TU-142 Bear F and 18 IL-38 May NATO naval forces, large Soviet forces would be
fixed-wing ASW aircraft are also part of the Noithern available to confront them in the Barents Sea. In
Fleet, and about 15 of each probably would be addition to available naval strike aircraft, these forces
available for patrols throughout the Norwegian Sea. could include 10 submarines (nearly 15 percent of
The TU-142s probably would conduct missions in those available). These would be mostly medium-
southern portions of the Norwegian Sea to take advan- range torpedo attack units, possibly supplemented by
tage of their greater endurance, while the IL-38s one or two J-class cruise missile submarines. In addi-
would patrol farther north. If the TU-1i42s in this force tion, about 17 destroyers and frigates, plus about 20
spent about five hours on station and suffered no missile patrol boats, about 19 short-range ASW fixed-
combat attrition, the force could mount about nine wing aircraft, and about 40 ASW helicopters probably
missions per day for the first three days of combat, would be available for operations in the approaches to
and about seven missions per day thereafter. Under the Barents. Some tactical aircraft supporting land
the same conditions in the central area the IL-38 force operations in the area might also be made available for
could average about 10 missions per day for the first antiship attacks. The seaward approaches to the Mur-
three days and about eight missions per day thereafter. mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise
missiles of the Soviet Navy's coastal missile and artil-
188. The Soviets would also have 21 TU-95 long- lery force.
range and 17 TU-16 medium-range reconnaissance
aircraft available for comprehensive surveillance of Potential Effectiveness "
the Norwegian Sea. Four of the TU-95s could be
deployed to Cuba and Angola, although they would be 191. Submarines. In conducting these operations,
extremely vulnerable if they attempted to operate Soviet submarines would be present in large numbers,
from these countries in wartime. Some TU-95 sorties but they would be limited by their poor detection
to the North Atlantic through the G-I-UK gap prob- capability against Western ballistic missile and attack
ably would be attempted to verify intelligence infor- submarines. This makes it unlikely that Soviet subma-
mation on important targets, such as aircraft carriers rines would be able to solve the initial ASW problem
heading toward the Norwegian Sea or North Sea. If of target location and would make it difficult to
TU-95s flew to their maximum endurance of about 19 protect themselves from NATO submarines.
hours, the TU-95 force could average some six missions 192. The Soviets consider that a key but difficult
per day for the first three days of combat, and five task for their attack submarines during the conven-
missions per day thereafter. If the TU-16s flew to their tional phase of a war would be the protection of Soviet
maximum endurance of about seven hours, the force SSBNs from NATO ASW forces, particularly nuclear
could average some 15 missions per day for the first attack submarines (SSNs). The Y-class, for example,
three days, and 12 missions per day thereafter. not only is much noisier than Western nuclear subma-
189. Several NATO aircraft carrier task groups rines, but also, in order for its SS-N-6 missiles to reach
189.SevralNATOairraf cariertas grups targets in the United States, must operate in areas
entering the Norwegian Sea at the same time would
complicate the situation for Soviet anticarrier forces where it is subject to detection by the US sound
because they would divide Soviet firepower. The surveillance system (SOSUS) and where it would have
Soviets probably hope that hostile carrier task groups little or no support from other Soviet forces. The
would be weakened sufficiently by initial submarine Soviets therefore probably would assign a few of their
attacks in the G-I-UK area so that their destruction cu ee paragraphs 198-200, setting forth an alternative view ofcould be completed in the central Nowegian Sea withm the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of
the forces available. If the Soviets were certain that Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, regarding paragraphs
NATO was about to send more than two carrier task 191-197.
IV-40

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.