Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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LRA bombers to operations elsewhere. Attacks could could form a second line of defense against Western
also be conducted against NATO radar installations by strike forces which penetrated into the Norwegian Sea,
Northern Fleet naval aircraft using antiradiation and some probably would assist in securing the operat-
missiles. ing areas of Soviet D-class SSBNs from Western ASW
180. It is unlikely that any Soviet surface combatant ships and submarines.
ships would be concentrated initially near the G-I-UK 184. About 18 of the available major surface com-
gap because they would be vulnerable to air attacks if batant ships in the Northern Fleet, including a Kiev
NATO maintained air superiority in the area. In aircraft carrier, six guided-missile cruisers, four
addition, fighter air cover for Soviet surface ships guided-missile destroyers, and seven destroyers and
would be unavailable there because of the distances frigates probably would also be used in the central
from Warsaw Pact airfields. YAK-36 V/STOL (verti- Norwegian Sea. Although the primary purpose of
cal/short takeoff and landing) aircraft operating from these forces would be ASW, they would have a
the Kiev aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob-
to cope effectively with NATO high-performance ably carries a mix of YAK-36 V/STOL aircraft for
fighters. reconnaissance strikes against surface ships and limited
181. Operations in the Central Norwegian Sea. air defense and Hormone helicopters for antisub-
From the central Norwegian Sea north to the Barents marine warfare. Another 13 major surface combatants
Sea, the Soviets would attempt to establish total sea in the Northern Fleet, including a Sverdlov heavy
control. They probably would deploy most of the cruiser, probably would operate in the northern Nor-
remaining Northern Fleet submarines plus some major wegian Sea in support of Soviet amphibious operations
surface combatant task groups to the central Norwe- against Norway.
gian Sea. ASW aircraft probably would conduct area 185. In the central Norwegian Sea, attacks by strike
searches in coordination with the surface ships and aircraft operating from Northern Fleet airbases would
attack submarines to find and destroy NATO SSBNs be more massive and more frequent than those con-
and attack submarines. Antiship strikes by naval and ducted farther to the south. This fact, coupled with the
LRA aircraft would be conducted in conjunction with expected higher force levels of surface combatants and
those of surface ships and submarines submarines in the central Norwegian Sea, would in-
182. A NATO naval task force entering the central crease the probability of successful antiship strikes.
Norwegian Sea would have to deal with continuous There are about 56 TU-16 Badger air-to-surface anti-
attacks by Soviet strike aircraft, submarines, and sur- ship missile carriers available in the Northern Fleet.
face ships. Some of these attacks would be massive and During a period of conventional attacks, about one-
highly coordinated. In coordinated attacks involving third of this strike force would probably be held in
mixed forces, all forces would not necessarily strike readiness for rapid transition to nuclear operations.
simultaneously. Exercises evidently have shown the Assuming no reinforcement by other fleet air forces
Soviets that simultaneous strikes by aircraft,. subma- and minimal combat attrition, we would expect the
rines, and surface ships would be infeasible in most remaining aircraft to conduct an average of about 1.5
situations because of the problems in bringing all sorties per aircraft per day for the first three days of
forces to bear at the same time. Coordinated attacks combat. After this initial surge period, crew fatigue,
probably would be keyed to a prescribed time or mechanical problems, the repair of combat damage,
attack sequence. An individual attacking unit or group and to a significant degree the status of potential
would attack at its appointed time without waiting for targets, would impact on sortie rates-probably de-
confirmation that other forces were ready for the creasing them substantially.
attack. 186. Northern Fleet strike aircraft could be aug-
183. The naval forces deployed in the central Nor- mented with LRA bombers and naval strike aircraft
wegian Sea probably would include about one-fourth redeployed from other fleets. In a NATO-Warsaw
of the Northern Fleet's available cruise missile and Pact war, however, most LRA and Baltic and Black
torpedo attack submarines (about 18 units). These Sea Fleet aircraft might be unavailable for operations
could include most (about five) of the J-class diesel in the Atlantic because of commitments in the West-
submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles and ern and Southwestern TVDs. Also, if the Soviets
the remaining third (fewer than five) of the V-class perceived the threat in the Pacific to remain high,
attack submarine fleet. Some of these submarines Pacific Fleet aircraft would be unavailable for re-
IV-39