Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
op LRA bombers to operations elsewhere. Attacks could could form a second line of defense against Western also be conducted against NATO radar installations by strike forces which penetrated into the Norwegian Sea, Northern Fleet naval aircraft using antiradiation and some probably would assist in securing the operat- missiles. ing areas of Soviet D-class SSBNs from Western ASW 180. It is unlikely that any Soviet surface combatant ships and submarines. ships would be concentrated initially near the G-I-UK 184. About 18 of the available major surface com- gap because they would be vulnerable to air attacks if batant ships in the Northern Fleet, including a Kiev NATO maintained air superiority in the area. In aircraft carrier, six guided-missile cruisers, four addition, fighter air cover for Soviet surface ships guided-missile destroyers, and seven destroyers and would be unavailable there because of the distances frigates probably would also be used in the central from Warsaw Pact airfields. YAK-36 V/STOL (verti- Norwegian Sea. Although the primary purpose of cal/short takeoff and landing) aircraft operating from these forces would be ASW, they would have a the Kiev aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope effectively with NATO high-performance ably carries a mix of YAK-36 V/STOL aircraft for fighters. reconnaissance strikes against surface ships and limited 181. Operations in the Central Norwegian Sea. air defense and Hormone helicopters for antisub- From the central Norwegian Sea north to the Barents marine warfare. Another 13 major surface combatants Sea, the Soviets would attempt to establish total sea in the Northern Fleet, including a Sverdlov heavy control. They probably would deploy most of the cruiser, probably would operate in the northern Nor- remaining Northern Fleet submarines plus some major wegian Sea in support of Soviet amphibious operations surface combatant task groups to the central Norwe- against Norway. gian Sea. ASW aircraft probably would conduct area 185. In the central Norwegian Sea, attacks by strike searches in coordination with the surface ships and aircraft operating from Northern Fleet airbases would attack submarines to find and destroy NATO SSBNs be more massive and more frequent than those con- and attack submarines. Antiship strikes by naval and ducted farther to the south. This fact, coupled with the LRA aircraft would be conducted in conjunction with expected higher force levels of surface combatants and those of surface ships and submarines submarines in the central Norwegian Sea, would in- 182. A NATO naval task force entering the central crease the probability of successful antiship strikes. Norwegian Sea would have to deal with continuous There are about 56 TU-16 Badger air-to-surface anti- attacks by Soviet strike aircraft, submarines, and sur- ship missile carriers available in the Northern Fleet. face ships. Some of these attacks would be massive and During a period of conventional attacks, about one- highly coordinated. In coordinated attacks involving third of this strike force would probably be held in mixed forces, all forces would not necessarily strike readiness for rapid transition to nuclear operations. simultaneously. Exercises evidently have shown the Assuming no reinforcement by other fleet air forces Soviets that simultaneous strikes by aircraft,. subma- and minimal combat attrition, we would expect the rines, and surface ships would be infeasible in most remaining aircraft to conduct an average of about 1.5 situations because of the problems in bringing all sorties per aircraft per day for the first three days of forces to bear at the same time. Coordinated attacks combat. After this initial surge period, crew fatigue, probably would be keyed to a prescribed time or mechanical problems, the repair of combat damage, attack sequence. An individual attacking unit or group and to a significant degree the status of potential would attack at its appointed time without waiting for targets, would impact on sortie rates-probably de- confirmation that other forces were ready for the creasing them substantially. attack. 186. Northern Fleet strike aircraft could be aug- 183. The naval forces deployed in the central Nor- mented with LRA bombers and naval strike aircraft wegian Sea probably would include about one-fourth redeployed from other fleets. In a NATO-Warsaw of the Northern Fleet's available cruise missile and Pact war, however, most LRA and Baltic and Black torpedo attack submarines (about 18 units). These Sea Fleet aircraft might be unavailable for operations could include most (about five) of the J-class diesel in the Atlantic because of commitments in the West- submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles and ern and Southwestern TVDs. Also, if the Soviets the remaining third (fewer than five) of the V-class perceived the threat in the Pacific to remain high, attack submarine fleet. Some of these submarines Pacific Fleet aircraft would be unavailable for re- IV-39
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.