Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
Top eci_ reconnaissance aircraft and intelligence collection submarines armed with long-range cruise missiles. If ships are important elements of Soviet ocean surveil- positioned 150 nautical miles north of the gap and lance because they can monitor the disposition of provided with externally derived targeting support, NATO naval surface forces in distant areas without three or four E-II-class submarines could theoretically relying on NATO electronic emissions. Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would suffer knowledge of Soviet planning factors indicates, that heavy attrition. TU-95 reconnaissance operations they probably would regard the level of coverage probably would then be restricted primarily to the provided by this number of submarines as barely Norwegian Sea, with occasional sorties into the North adequate in nuclear war, however, and clearly insuffi- Atlantic. cient for a conventional conflict. They may also . .n assume that some of these units would be destroyed by 172. Operations in the G-i-UK Gap. NATO ASW forces before they could launch their the Soviets probably would plan for their missiles and that NATO would send more than a single first large-scale strikes on NATO surface forces to carrier into a strongly contested area such as the occur in the G-I-UK gap area. These strikes probably Norwegin a. would be conducted mainly by cruise missile subma- rines patrolling 150 to 200 nautical miles north of the 176. We believe that the Soviets would deploy most gap, although some strikes by naval aircraft, and or all of the available 10 E-II-class cruise missile perhaps LRA aircraft, would probably also be made in submarines to positions within 200 nni of the G-I-UK the area of the gap. gap. This number of submarines would provide the . .e concentration of conventional fire throughout the area 173. The Soviets evidently do not plan on statioing which Soviet planning factors indicate is required to large naval forces in the C-i-UK gap itself. Exercises disable aircraft carriers-some six to 10 hits each. and military writings indicate that the Soviets believe Some J-class units could also be used, but they carry this area would almost certainly be dominated early in onl half t nume of mls as th e cau . a war by NATO air and ASW forces. Nonetheless, the only half the number of missiles as the E-II-class units. Soviets stress the utility of placing submarines, particu- 177. Antiship attacks by submarines in the G-I-UK larly diesel units, in geographically constricted waters gap probably would be supplemented by strikes by where their chances of acquiring targets are greater. aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation and possibly Long They could deploy one-half (about 10) of the available Range Aviation. From Northern Fleet airfields, the long-range diesel submarines in or near the gap, where Backfire bomber and some TU-16 Badgers with aerial they would serve in both reconnaissance and attack refueling could reach targets throughout the C-I-UK roles. The Soviets might also deploy some C-class gap and the northern approaches to the North Sea. nuclear-powered submarines to attack aircraft carriers From Baltic Fleet airfields, SNA aircraft could strike in the gap area. Concentrating C-class submarines in targets between Iceland and Great Britain and in the these relatively constricted waters would reduce the approaches to the North Sea. C-class's open-ocean disadvantages of slow speed rela- 178. Airstrikes in the G-I-UK gap would be espe- tive to strike carriers. All these submarines could also cially hazardous for Soviet aircraft because of NATO conduct ASW searches while patrolling in the area. land-based air defenses in the area. (See figure IV-8.) 174. The Soviets probably could not establish a The Soviets probably believe that NATO would aug- comprehensive submarine ASW barrier across the ment these air defenses with additional fighters in G-I-UK gap, even if NATO ASW forces were not a time of war. Consequently, the Soviets would be likely consideration. US experience shows that such a barrier to limit antiship attacks by strike aircraft in the would require 30 or more nuclear-powered attack G-I-UK gap to NATO aircraft carrier and amphibious submarines or twice as many diesel units. Because of task groups in the approaches to the North Sea which their inferior detection capabilities, considerably more pose a direct threat to the Western TVD. Strike Soviet submarines would be required to perform the aircraft might also attack NATO antisubmarine forces same task. However, only about 17 nuclear and 28 which were in a position to impede the movement of diesel-powered torpedo attack submarines from Soviet submarines to and from their patrol areas. Northern Fleet bases would be available for deploy- ment in the entire Atlantic. 179. We have tenuous evidence of Soviet plans for strikes by LRA Bears against NATO bases in Norway, 175. The Soviets could more easily cover the Great Britain, and Iceland. Such strikes early in a war G-I-UK gap against Western aircraft carriers by using could be constrained, however, by the commitment of IV-37 Top ~eco
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.