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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“The Advance”37 pages

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the North Atlantic Figure IV-7
< (.1. Sea control.
1 Sea control
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t Western naval bases offWhich Soviet
(Poss bio staging base for TU-95 submarines might be deployed
reconnaissance aircraft) - -
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577642 1-9 CIA
gian Sea. This view is based on a differing interpreta- aircraft frequently exercise in the area south of Ice-
tion of the evidence as reflected in paragraphs 142-149 land and in the G-I-UK gap and could operate there
of chapter II. These agencies consider that the Soviets for at least several hours before returning to base.
view interdiction of US reinforcements to Europe to Operations by ASW aircraft probably would be re-
he of such significance and their submarine inventory stricted to the Norwegian Sea north of the G-I-UK
of sufficient depth to warrant use of larger numbers of gap, however, because ASW aircraft are highly vulner-
attack submarines in this effort while maintaining able to Western air defenses and probably would rot
adequate forces near the G-I-UK gap and in the be able to operate safely near the G-I-UK gap once
Norwegian Sea. Accordingly, the number of attack hostilities began. Similarly, Soviet surface combatant
submarines would be correspondingly lower than the ships probably would not deploy south of Iceland for
10 torpedo attack submarines postulated for deploy- initial wartime operations because NA'TO would likely
ment near the G-I-UK gap in paragraph 173 below, or have air superiority there.
the 10 or so torpedo attack submarines postulated for
the central Norwegian Sea in paragraph 183. 171. In addition to submarines, Soviet naval recon-
naissance forces in the Atlantic would include intelli-
170. Submarine ASW operations in the North At- gence collection ships and TU-95 long-range recon-
lantic could be augmented by TU-142 Bear F long- naissance aircraft operating from Northern Fleet
range ASW aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. These airfields, and possibly Cuba and Angola. Long-range
-V-36
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.