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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“Mission Control”29 pages

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Initial Soviet Operating Areas in the North Atlantic Figure IV-7
< (.1. Sea control.
1 Sea control
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_ G+UK "r'
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t Charleston
t Mayport -
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t Western naval bases offWhich Soviet
(Poss bio staging base for TU-95 submarines might be deployed
reconnaissance aircraft) - -
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gian Sea. This view is based on a differing interpreta- aircraft frequently exercise in the area south of Ice-
tion of the evidence as reflected in paragraphs 142-149 land and in the G-I-UK gap and could operate there
of chapter II. These agencies consider that the Soviets for at least several hours before returning to base.
view interdiction of US reinforcements to Europe to Operations by ASW aircraft probably would be re-
he of such significance and their submarine inventory stricted to the Norwegian Sea north of the G-I-UK
of sufficient depth to warrant use of larger numbers of gap, however, because ASW aircraft are highly vulner-
attack submarines in this effort while maintaining able to Western air defenses and probably would rot
adequate forces near the G-I-UK gap and in the be able to operate safely near the G-I-UK gap once
Norwegian Sea. Accordingly, the number of attack hostilities began. Similarly, Soviet surface combatant
submarines would be correspondingly lower than the ships probably would not deploy south of Iceland for
10 torpedo attack submarines postulated for deploy- initial wartime operations because NA'TO would likely
ment near the G-I-UK gap in paragraph 173 below, or have air superiority there.
the 10 or so torpedo attack submarines postulated for
the central Norwegian Sea in paragraph 183. 171. In addition to submarines, Soviet naval recon-
naissance forces in the Atlantic would include intelli-
170. Submarine ASW operations in the North At- gence collection ships and TU-95 long-range recon-
lantic could be augmented by TU-142 Bear F long- naissance aircraft operating from Northern Fleet
range ASW aircraft of Soviet Naval Aviation. These airfields, and possibly Cuba and Angola. Long-range
-V-36
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.